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Abstract

Since the origin of formal humanitarianism with the Geneva Conventions of 1864,

aid organizations have become a major player on the global stage. Humanitarian aid has
gone through significant changes over the years, being influenced by international events
and the evolution of international relations. As with other international actors, aid
organizations encounter a number of dilemmas, and this thesis aims to address one of the
more recent struggles of aid agencies.

The fundamental principles of impartiality and

neutrality have become controversial, especially in complex humanitarian situations such
as the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.

This catastrophe is known as the Great Lakes

Refugee Crisis, and this thesis addresses the difficulties faced by humanitarian aid

agencies, how the crisis was perpetuated by aid, and some possible solutions for future

crises. This includes an analysis of three organizations: the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and Doctors Without Borders.

Data was derived from original documents from these organizations, as well as personal
testimonies and secondary historical sources.

Conclusions consist of policy

recommendations on security, accountability, and training in aid organizations for an

overall boost in professionalism in the field of humanitarianism.

Summary/Abstract Table

Actions during the Great Lakes crisis

UNHCR is responsible for overseeing the

JNHCR

WFP

MSF

actions of other aid organizations, as well
as ensuring the protection and security of
the refugees themselves
In the Great Lakes crisis, security was the
main issue for the UNHCR
Lack of manpower and willpower to
provide this security caused the UNHCR
to fail to ensure the safety of the refugees
involved. This had a ripple effect on the
work of other organizations that relied so
heavily on that security.

Relation to Impartiality and Neutrality

The militarization of the refugee camps
during the Great Lakes crisis was a result
of the lack of security, which was a result

of a lack of adherence to these principles.
This compromises the neutrality of the
aid that is being given and the
impartiality of the way it is being given
because there is no way to monitor who
is being given aid.
Ensuring the UNHCR’s ability to provide
security during crises would heighten its
ability to guarantee impartiality and
neutrality.

The World Food Programme is well
known as the major food aid supplier
during major crises.
Its policy did not recognize food aid as
being able to be manipulated. Food aid
was widely manipulated during the
refugee camps in Zaire.
A lack of recognition of the ability of
food aid to be misappropriated led to the
organization’s not paying attention to
food pipelines and how the food was
distributed once it arrived at the camps.

In its belief that food aid is unlikely to be
manipulated, the organization fails to
ensure these principles, simply because it
believes that there is no chance of the aid

As an independent organization, MSF has
set up pre-requisites for its involvement
in acrisis. These pre-requisites include
security in the area and support from
local government.
During the Great Lakes crisis, the safety
of the region (being the responsibility of

These pre-requisites were put into place
in order to ensure MSF’s impartiality and
neutrality. Because MSF failed to follow
its own policies, it also failed to provide
impartial and neutral aid to the refugees.
This was partially due to the lack of
security, and MSF had no way of
monitoring who received aid.
Despite its good intentions, MSF could
not have effectively provided aid in a
neutral and impartial way. Had the
organization been accountable within
itself, it could have recognized this risk.

UNHCR) did not meet MSF’s standards;
therefore, MSF should not have

intervened.
When the organization did intervene, it
encountered several issues in the camps
and disagreements among its members.

not being impartial or neutral.

This, we

can see, is a grave mistake.
Impartiality and neutrality are not innate
characteristics of any type of aid and
must be monitored and ensured by the aid
agency.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and the establishment of formal
humanitarianism through the International Committee of the Red Cross, humanitarian aid
has gone through an extraordinary evolution.

The very concept of humanitarian aid has

changed through the experiences of the last 140 years, but the founding principles of
impartiality and neutrality have remained the same.

The purpose of this thesis is to

highlight the consequences of non-adherence to these principles during humanitarian
crises by analyzing specific aid organizations and their actions during a crisis. My
research will analyze the militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Congo
(then Zaire) during the Great Lakes refugee crisis from 1994 to 1996. More specifically,
I will answer the following questions: what factors led to the militarization of the
Rwandan refugee camps in Congo from 1994 until 1996, and what role did impartiality
and neutrality play in creating an environment in which these factors could exist? To do
this, I will look at the evolution of the concept of humanitarian aid and the founding
principles of impartiality and neutrality, how those principles have been defined, and they
have interacted with aid distribution.
The mission statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
according to the organization’s website, explains that it is “an impartial, neutral and
independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives
and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide
them with assistance” (ICRC). The organization is founded on seven fundamental

principles:

humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and

universality. These principles are also reiterated in their code of conduct, which I will
discuss later.
Impartiality and neutrality are defined by the ICRC in the document The
International Committee of the Red Cross: Its Mission and Work as follows:

first,

impartiality is “a principle that rejects any form of discrimination, calls for equal

treatment for people in distress, according to their needs. It enables the ICRC to
prioritize its activities on the basis of the degree of urgency and the types of needs of
those affected” (404). This principle, one that has been adopted by several other
humanitarian organizations, reiterates the general principles of non-discrimination.
However, any form of discrimination includes discrimination based on political and/or
group affiliation, former actions that might have contributed to the need for aid, and
participation in other abuses of aid, situations in which it would perhaps be logical to
differentiate. This principle, as defined by the ICRC, allows for the differentiation based
on needs, enabling the humanitarian organizations to organize its efforts and resources.
Most organizations have various procedures of evaluating the needs of a population, and
resources fund activities to meet those needs that the organization deems the most
important or immediate.

I give examples of this in chapter four.

Second, neutrality enables the ICRC to keep everyone’s trust by not taking sides in
hostilities or controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
Neutrality does not mean indifference to suffering, acceptance of war or
quiescence in the face of inhumanity; rather, it means not engaging in

controversies that divide peoples. The ICRC’s work benefits from this
principle because it enables the organization to make more contacts and gain access
to those affected. (404)

In other words, the ICRC’s concept of neutrality allows them to be a nonaligned party
during a conflict in order to coordinate with both sides.

Unlike the principles of

impartiality, neutrality is designed to keep the ICRC completely unbiased.

Impartiality

allows organizations to say no to giving aid to particular groups, such as those who
committed genocide in Rwanda.

After organizations have determined whom they can

and will give aid to, the principle of neutrality ensures that no one within that group will
be discriminated against because of race, gender, religion, or ideological nature.

Authors

such as Charlotte Ku and Joaquin Caceres Brun discuss the neutrality of the ICRC in
contemporary humanitarian operations and how neutrality has been questioned in blurry
situations in which it is not clear to whom aid should or should not be given.

Although

neutrality is a widely accepted principle, it has been difficult to fully adhere to it in the
aid community, “with some organizations implying that maintaining neutrality in
instances of gross violations of human rights is tantamount of complicity with those
violations” (Brun: 57).

The Great Lakes refugee crisis is one such instance that falls in

this category, as we will see later.
It is important to note here at the beginning of this thesis that I will be promoting
my own interpretation of these principles throughout my argument.
the documented definitions, both principles are broadly defined.

As one can see from

Like most other

overarching principles, these definitions were meant to be applicable to all situations,
thus their vagueness.

As I will later describe, situations such as the Great Lakes crisis

posed a challenge to these principles and the interpretations thereof.

However, I present

my interpretation of these principles in light of this crisis and argue that they should be
more clearly understood throughout the aid community as well as more strongly
enforced.

In order to understand these principles and their effects on the aid community, |

will begin this thesis with the history of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

I

do this for several reasons. First, the ICRC originated as an organization mandated by
the 1949 Geneva Conventions to carry out formal, structured humanitarianism.
According to the ICRC, the Geneva Conventions “task the ICRC with visiting prisoners,
organizing relief operations, re-uniting separated families and similar humanitarian
activities during armed conflicts” (Dérmann).

In the aftermath of World War I, it was a

priority of the participating countries of the Geneva Convention of 1864 that ambulances,
military hospitals, and official medical personnel remain neutral and impartial in order to
attend to the wounded without discrimination. States that are party to the Geneva
Conventions also confirm the Statutes of the ICRC, which “encourage it to undertake
similar work in situations of internal violence, where the Geneva Conventions do not

apply,” making the Statues “soft law” (Janis: 46). The distinction here between “hard”
and “soft” law refers to “the difference between rules of law meant to be followed and
norms meant merely to set out preferred outcomes”

(Ibid.). The ICRC has defined itself

as being the at “birth of international humanitarian law”, and it has worked in most major

crises of the past 146 years, making it a pivotal factor in humanitarian aid today (ICRC).
Secondly, the Red Cross has served as a model for other organizations.

Dorothea

Hilhorst, in her article "Being Good at Doing Good? Quality and Accountability of
Humanitarian NGOs", notes that over 207 organizations have adopted the ICRC’s code
of conduct (Hilhorst: 207).

This code of conduct, aiming to establish a common standard

for relief work, “identifies the alleviation of human suffering as the prime motivation for
humanitarian assistance, which must be provided on the basis of need alone and not as an

instrument of government or foreign policy — ideals which correspond closely to the Red

Cross/Red Crescent Principles of humanity, impartiality and independence” (ICRC).
These foundational principles are reiterated within its code of conduct, which has
penetrated the humanitarian aid community and influenced the way in which many other
organizations operate (ICRC).

This influence implies several things about my proposed

research: it gives validity to the ICRC and its strategy, and it raises concern about
whether or not these organizations should be modeled upon the ICRC.

It is clear that

other organizations have taken up these principles, using the ICRC as a model for how
aid is enacted.
The Great Lakes refugee crisis was one of the most devastating crises of the 20"
century.

After the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi in 1994, Rwandan Hutus were forced

by the Tutsi into neighboring countries, such as Congo and Tanzania.

From 1994 to

1996, Rwandan Hutu military leaders established training bases inside and around the
refugee camps.

Military leaders were able to stockpile weapons, recruit and train refugee

fighters, and launch cross-border attacks against Tutsi-controlled Rwanda.

In late 1996,

the militarization of the camps had become so strong that it provoked a Rwandan
invasion of and attacks against the refugee camps.

Not only did the militarization of the

Rwandan refugee camps spur more conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, it
caused violence to be spread to more than a dozen surrounding states and rebel groups.
Despite the fact that they contained thousands of perpetrators of genocide, the refugee
camps were internationally supported in such a way that they were able to obtain
resources to perpetuate the conflict (Lischer: 1-2).
Many scholars have done work on this crisis, especially on the Rwandan refugee
camps in eastern Congo.

However, the majority of these scholars research the effects of

the militarization of refugee camps and how aid organizations reacted or should have
reacted. My research aims to track the variables that led to this militarization and to
study how, specifically, impartiality and neutrality were related to these variables.
The Great Lakes crisis also begs the question of whether neutral humanitarian aid

was even possible. Ignoring militarization while attempting to distribute aid to a refugee
camp can aid belligerents and, in the case of the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire, fuel
the conflict. Failure to adhere to the principle of impartiality is also dangerous when an
organization provides assistance based solely on need and does not determine whether or
not the recipients of this assistance include refugee warriors.

As stated before, adherence

to neutrality would help to ensure that aid was given to those who might abuse or
misappropriate it. As stated by the ICRC, “neutrality does not mean indifference to
suffering, acceptance of war or quiescence in the face of inhumanity.” My interpretation
of this assumes that aid organizations will not provide aid to those who cause suffering or
war. If aid organizations did not differentiate between those who caused suffering or war
and those who did not, they would become indifferent to these atrocities.

In defense of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fabrizio Hochschild said, “Even
the guilty need to be fed” (Rieff: 54). Despite the truth of that statement, whose
responsibility is it to feed those who are guilty? Does that fall under the jurisdiction of

humanitarian aid organizations, or does it actually compromise their foundational goals?
In the case of the Great Lakes, non-adherence to these principles compromised the
purpose of aid organizations and their responsibilities to the victims. Because there is
widespread acceptance of these principles as the model of how to enact humanitarian aid,
it is evident that research that highlights the possible flaws in the foundation is of extreme

importance.

In addition, however desirable these principles may be, “any humanitarian

action in a conflict zone will have political, and possibly military, consequences no
matter how apolitical the intent” (Lischer: 9). I recognize that some conflicts cannot be
avoided, and there are unavoidable dilemmas in humanitarian aid that will always exist.

However, this research aims to highlight those dilemmas that could be avoided if there
were stronger adherence to principles such as impartiality and neutrality, thereby
avoiding the creation of environments in which the militarization of refugee camps can
thrive.
In the second chapter of this thesis, I will lay the historical background of formal
humanitarianism and track its evolution from its birth in 1864 until the events of the
Great Lakes refugee crisis, which I will be using as a case study. I detail the history of
the International Committee of the Red Cross, because this organization is widely known
to be the first formal humanitarian organization. Because of the importance of this
historical framework, part of this chapter will be dedicated to answering the question,
“How did formal humanitarianism begin?”

In answering this question, I will also look at

humanitarianism’s legal ties to international humanitarian law and the law’s significance
in the establishment of the ICRC.
Upon the establishment of the ICRC, several humanitarian principles were also set
in place. Two of these principles, impartiality and neutrality, will be the focus of my
analysis. These principles have been engrained in the codes of the ICRC and have
therefore been highly influential in the rest of the aid community.

Since their founding

within the ICRC, these principles have withstood global tension and international crises.

But how have these principles of impartiality and neutrality changed since their
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establishment?

How do today’s aid organizations enact or define them differently than in

the past? In order to answer this question, I will mention several global situations that
have forced humanitarian organizations to re-strategize or clarify these principles and
their application. One example of an international crisis that reshaped humanitarian

policy is the Vietnam War. I will discuss some of the major changes that international
humanitarian law has experienced and the laws that were in place when the Rwandan
genocide occurred.

Over time, these doctrines have become more and more specific, so I

will study the policies that directly pertain to the Great Lakes refugee crisis.
Throughout the chapter, I aim to explain the evolution of humanitarian aid in a way
that helps to shed light on how humanitarian organizations function today. Particularly in
regards to these founding principles, I highlight the historical content that justifies the
changes that humanitarianism has gone through and show how these changes have
molded how humanitarianism is enacted today. Are the ways and principles of
humanitarianism outdated or are they still applicable to today’s world and its modern
crises? This chapter helps to answer my overall research question.
The third chapter explains the Great Lakes refugee crisis, which is the case study
for this research.

I give an account of the events in Rwanda and surrounding countries

the preceded the genocide in the 1990s.

I outline the major events that led to the

genocide, as well as explain important social factors that set the scene for the conflict.
This genocide led to a mass migration of Hutu refugees into neighboring countries such
as Zaire and Tanzania, which was the stage for the Great Lakes refugee crisis.
I analyze specific factors that caused this refugee crisis, particularly the factors that

led to the militarization of the refugee camps. This includes the political position of the
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host countries, the refugees themselves, and the global community who participated in
giving aid to these refugees. What factors were present before the humanitarian aid
organizations entered the scene?

I will describe the conditions inside the refugee camps

that were set up in cities and towns in Zaire and Tanzania, as well as the social and

political environment.

Through this thorough description, readers will get a clearer

picture of the crisis itself and the major factors that created this particular environment.
It is also important to discuss how this crisis is similar to or different from other
major humanitarian crises of the 20" century. As discussed in the second chapter, crises
such as the Vietnam War shaped how international aid organizations handled conflicts in
which guerrilla warfare blurred the line between civilian and soldier. The newly
reformed law should have applied to the case of Rwanda and surrounding countries;
however, the lessons of Vietnam did not seem to influence the actions during the

Rwandan crisis. Why weren’t these new policies implemented, and what might have
caused this shortcoming?
In the fourth chapter, I look more closely at the actions of the humanitarian aid
agencies themselves.

More specifically, I analyze the policies and programs of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and Doctors
Without Borders.

What action or inaction by these organizations worsened the crisis?

To do this, I will look at the programs and policies of major organizations that were
working in the refugee camps, as well as direct accounts and personal experiences of
workers of these organizations.

These factors, which I list in chapter four, will reflect

how the militarization of the refugee camps took place.

My research will then investigate the relationships between the ways in which the
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aid organization contributed to the militarization of the refugee camps and the principles

of impartiality and neutrality that I discuss in chapter two. Was it adherence or nonadherence that inspired these factors? These relationships will be a key contribution to
the general question of my thesis. The following are the five variables on which I will

focus: the number of humanitarian organizations that were participating in aid delivery;
the various ways that humanitarian aid can be exploited; the role of the refugees;
knowledge or lack thereof of the conflict on the part of the aid organizations; and
accountability within the organizations to uphold these founding principles.

I will look at

each of these factors individually, based on information from primary resources as well
as the work of scholars.

I will then draw connections between the variables and the

principles being studied. This these is therefore a relational study on how the presence or
absence of these foundational principles to humanitarianism affected the factors that led
to and fueled this crisis. The results of this study will show the significance and
effectiveness of foundational principles within the aid community.
The final chapter will discuss the overall findings of the study and their
implications.

By looking at the development of humanitarian aid, the factors that led to

this particular crisis, both within the aid organizations as well as from the state actors,
and the significance and effects of the principles of impartiality and neutrality, the results
of this thesis will shed light on this importance of holding aid organization accountable
for their actions and call for a higher standard in the implementation of aid. The age of
these principles may lead one to believe that the organizations themselves have forgotten
their foundation.

However, this case study will show that when these principles are not

implemented on the field, the results can be dangerous and embarrassing.

In the end, my

aim is not only to find the factors that led to the militarization of the refugee camps
during the Great Lakes crisis, but to also find the relationship between those factors and
these founding principles.
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Chapter 2: History of the ICRC and the Foundational Principles of Humanitarianism

In order to better understand the aid community and the crises it confronts, one
must look at its origin and evolution.

Because the important humanitarian principles of

impartiality and neutrality have helped lay a foundation for modern humanitarianism,
their evolution sheds light on their influences and characteristics. I begin with the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the grandfather of formal humanitarian aid,

and look at the major landmarks of its evolution.

The phases that the International

Committee of the Red Cross has gone through show the hurdles that it has encountered,
as well as adjustments to its policies that have surfaced along the way. The purpose of
this chapter is to clarify the history of the ICRC and these foundational principles to more
fully understand the very basis of humanitarianism.
Several authors have written extensively on the history of the ICRC, including
London-based journalist Caroline Moorehead; John F. Hutchinson, history professor at
Simon Fraser University; and David Forsythe, professor of political science at the
University of Nebraska.

According to these scholars, formal humanitarianism was born

out of the Napoleonic War and began with the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and the
establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

During the

Second Italian War of Independence, a spectator named Henri Dunant from Geneva
witnessed the aftermath of the battle of Solferino. The violence and chaos he saw in
Solferino inspired him to write a book, A Memory of Solferino, prompting influential
leaders in Europe to set up societies of volunteers during times of peace that would be

ready to help the wounded when wars broke out. He also encouraged the drawing up of

Bs)

international principles that would help form the philosophical basis of these societies
(Moorehead: 8).
One of the admirer of Dunant’s book was Gustave Moynier, philanthropist and
president of the Geneva Society for Public Utility (SGUP) (Hutchinson: 21). Moynier
expressed a positive reaction to Dunant’s proposition and raised the issue at an SGUP
meeting in February of 1863 (Hutchinson: 23). A committee of five was formed
consisting of Moynier, Swiss officer General Dufour, Swiss surgeons Dr. Louis Appia
and Dr. Théodore Maunoir, and Dunant; this group would soon become the independent
group of the International Committee to Assist the War Wounded (Hutchinson: 23).
Dunant began traveling around Europe, touring the courts of the German states to
promote the Committee’s idea before the upcoming conference in Geneva (Hutchinson:
28). Support was necessary, as the Committee was asking for the neutrality of military
medical personnel.

In other words, the Committee wanted medical personnel to assist all

sides of a conflict in an unbiased manner.

He returned to Geneva to prepare for the

convention that took place in October of 1863.
While the foundational proposal of the Committee to establish voluntary aid
organizations in each country did not necessarily demand international action, the
principle of neutrality behind military medical personnel could not be established without
it, according to Hutchinson.

This aspect of their proposal allowed states to “respond to

an increasingly vocal public opinion aroused by reports of the callous treatment of
soldiers, protect their investment in improved military medical services, and graciously
accede to this manifestation of patriotic enthusiasm” (Hutchinson: 30). Incorporating a

mentality of neutrality allowed for the participating nations to protect their own soldiers
during warfare, reaffirming the already strong sense of patriotism.
On October 26, the conference delegates assembled and began to draft an
agreement drawn up by Moynier.

The final resolution of the conference, however,

reflected the necessity of neutrality by making the following recommendation:
that in time of war the belligerent nations should proclaim the neutrality of

ambulances and military hospitals, and that neutrality should likewise be accorded,
fully and absolutely, to all official medical personnel, to volunteer nurses, to the
inhabitants of the country who go to the relief of the wounded, and to the wounded
themselves (Hutchinson: 37).

The International Congress that took place the following year aimed to draw up an
agreement that would embody this recommendation; it was, however, such a
controversial issue that in the end, volunteers were not specially designated at all in the
final draft (Hutchinson: 49). Nevertheless, the Geneva proposals came to be seen as the
“first codified humanitarian principles” (Moorehead: 23) through the foundation of the
International Committee of the Red Cross. Thus, the first aid organization was grounded
in international law, their mandate written by the parties of the Geneva Conventions.

During 1863 and 1864, the national committees were established and the ICRC began.
By 1949, the ICRC had already experienced several major wars within Europe,

including two world wars, and concluded seven conventions at Geneva in response to
these conflicts (Forsythe: 110).

1906 and 1929 were years in which the ICRC convened

to discuss the impacts of recent conflicts, including World War I, and reshaped their

original Convention.

Moorehead reports on the importance of the late 1940s for the

Committee: At the end of World War II, there was a defeatist attitude among the

organization, mostly due to the atrocities of the concentration camps.

Apologies were
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issued by those who felt that the Red Cross has failed in its duties to protect civilians and
soldiers, but nevertheless the number of volunteers dropped dramatically, as did funding.

Questions of whether or not the organization actually remained neutral during the
Second World War also resonated throughout the international community (Moorehead:
42-51). “No modern war had ever been as long, as intense, as murderous or as
widespread; never had the Red Cross emblem been so profoundly violated: and had never
had prisoners-of-war or civilians been so barbarically treated” (Moorehead: 553).

The

Geneva Conventions of 1864 had to be re-evaluated to discuss the impact that modern
warfare had had on the continent and the ICRC.

A conference was called for by the

Swiss confederation for which the International Committee prepared four draft
Conventions.

The Convention that was held in 1949 dealt with a significant number of

issues: prisoners-of-war, treatment of the sick and wounded, and civilians in war.

By

August, the new Conventions were ready to be signed, and they contained a new standard
for humanitarian law (Moorehead: 553-555).

This new focus on victims of war lead to a

new strain of legal thinking called the “Geneva traditions”, or “Geneva law”, or “Red
Cross Law” (Forsythe: 110).
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol I of 1977 grant

the ICRC a specific mandate to act in the event of an international armed conflict (ICRC).
The first of these conventions protects sick and wounded soldiers on land during war; the
second protects wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war; the
third applies to prisoners-of-war; and the fourth protects civilians, even in occupied
territory (ICRC).

Although all of these conventions are important, the fourth is most

pertinent to this study.

These conventions are the backbone of international humanitarian
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law and of the norms that are widely followed. With respect to these conventions and
protocols, the ICRC has the support of international law, a unique quality within the aid

community.

Nation-states collaborated to set up the mandate of the ICRC, thereby

creating a set of norms that has developed into international law.

Under these laws, the

ICRC’s mission statement reads as follows:

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial,

neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian
mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal
violence and to provide them with assistance.
It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by
the Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to prevent
suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal
humanitarian principles.
Established in 1863, the ICRC is at the origin of the International Red

Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC).

This mission statement reflects the vision of the participating members to create an
organization that upholds these specific principles with a purpose that will benefit the
international community as a whole, or at least those participating nations. The actual
application of this mission statement can be difficult to monitor, and this thesis aims to
shed light on the consequences of not applying it to the full degree.
International Humanitarian Law, or IHL, has been developed through “hard law”,
such as conventions, covenants, protocols, pacts, or other documents that are formally
signed by states that legally bind them to responsibilities.

It can also develop through

“soft law”, or the widespread practice of states that is generally accepted throughout the
international community as a norm (Janis: 47). Through both of these types of law, the
ICRC has been regarded as the guardian of international humanitarian law. This special
role has been designated to the ICRC through the Statues of the International Committee
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of the Red Cross, which has been adopted by the states party to the Geneva Conventions
(ICRC).

In Article 4, the Statues define the ICRC’s role as the organization to first,

“undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, to work for the
faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to

take cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law” and second,
“work for the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international

humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof”
(Statutes of the ICRC).

This again reiterates the mission of the ICRC, declaring the

mandate previously given by the party members of the Geneva Conventions.
The ICRC clearly has a unique place among the aid community.

Its influence can

be seen in that its Code of Conduct and practices have been widely adopted by other
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Hilhorst 207).

Its abilities and resources are

unlike any other in the aid community due to the amount of participants worldwide, their
strong bond to international law, and how their actions have set a precedent for how aid is
given and how JHL is enacted.

The ICRC has been a significant influence in the molding

of international humanitarian law and aid operations in general.
However, other factors continue to shape international humanitarian law and the

ways in which aid can and should be provided. This includes various types of warfare
that have posed challenges to the Geneva Conventions.

Especially on the continent of

Africa, the emergence of ‘guerilla’ warfare has gained a huge importance.

While the

economy and institutional infrastructure of certain African nations have faltered, armed
insurrection in the countryside of these countries has emerged.

Some of these

insurrections are created by a country’s own military forces in the form of military coups.
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Guerrilla warfare is especially hard to study or observe, given the inaccessibility of the

areas in which it usually arises and the level of violence and disruption that it creates
(Clapham: vii).

‘Guerilla’ warfare has been largely contrasted in European history to warfare
conducted by regular armies of well-established states. Therefore, it is sometimes
regarded as a normal type of warfare in countries that lack a powerful government.
Because of the lack of state organization in most African nations, guerilla warfare is
especially prominent on the continent. Author Christopher Claphan describes the
phenomenon as “the development of armed movements, usually originating in the
countryside and often attacking across state frontiers, which have sought to contest the
power of African states, and have frequently established their own forms of rule, in
territories from which the control of established states has disappeared” (Claphan: 1).
Particularly after the Second World War, African nations adopted this type of warfare as
the most effective and efficient when trying to defeat the highly organized and heavily
armed opponents, namely government regimes.

Several insurgencies emerged out of the

decolonization process, which we will see in my case study of Rwanda.

Like Rwanda,

several African countries experienced classical guerilla warfare, the emerging of small
armed bands in rural areas, driven by a political agenda that sought some form of
liberation (Claphan, 1-2).

The factors of leadership and ideology are particularly important in the case of
guerrilla warfare. The initiating of such an insurgency takes individual initiative, and
those who initiative the process have a great deal of power in how it should operate.
Most leaders of guerrilla movements have come out of elite sections of society, as
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politicians or military officials or among the educated sector (Claphan, 9). These leaders
and the members of the movement share a commitment to principles or goals that drive
the movement.

The leaders in the movement may gain high authoritarian positions, like

with the RPF in Rwanda where leaders were “able to enforce such stringent levels of

discipline that individuals responsible for the rape or the murder of civilians were
publicly executed” (Claphan, 10).
Historically, most insurgencies require external support, mostly for access across

the border of a neighboring state “which is prepared at least to turn a blind eye to its
activities, but also for weapons, money, diplomatic backing, and even food”(Claphan,
15). We will see this in Rwanda’s history, especially in the roles of Zaire and Uganda.
Therefore, guerilla war not only contributes to internal crises in a country but also often
spreads to the surrounding region, as it the case with the Great Lakes crisis. Guerilla

warfare it not a tactic that is used only in Africa. It has been used in Europe during both
world wars; Mexico, Argentina, and Peru; Asia during the Vietnam War; and even the

United States during the American Revolutionary war.
The prominence of guerilla warfare eventually forced the international
community to make laws even more narrow and specific. In this type of unconventional
warfare, guerillas often ignore the conventions’ rules, in particular the responsibility to
distinguish themselves from civilians. As opposed to warfare before the second half of
the 20" century, there had arisen a need to somehow distinguish between combatants and
non-combatants and formulate a way for the international community to approach these
increasingly complex conflicts. Therefore, in 1977, directly after the Vietnam War, two
protocols were proposed to be added to the Conventions of 1949: one for international
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conflicts, the other for intrastate armed conflicts (Forsythe: 113).

The first of these

protocols defines armed forces and combatants in Articles 43 and 44 within the protocol.
Article 43,1 defines ‘‘armed forces” as “groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.”

It also

equates armed forces with “combatants” in Article 43,2. Both articles are worth quoting

in their entirety for our discussion:
Article. 43,1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that
Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an

adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the

rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical
personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention)
are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in
hostilities.
Article 44,1 and 2 lays out the rights of the combatant when he becomes a prisoner of war
while Article 44,3 defines the obligations of the combatants, such as the obligation to

distinguish themselves from the civilian population. These are also worth quoting:

Article 44,1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the

power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules
shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls

into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war,
except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a

military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that

there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall
retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged

in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he
is to participate.
Although these protocols may not be absolute in their application on the field, it is
important to know how these terms- “combatant”, “civilian”, etc.- are defined in

regards to legal and organizational documents.

Especially in light of the ICRC’s

connection with international law and thereby humanitarianism’s link to legality,
it is helpful in understanding the implications of how the legal community
classifies these terms. This applies directly to the study of the Great Lakes Crisis,
as the perpetrators in the militarization hid their identity as combatants in order to
manipulate aid.
The second protocol aims to protect the victims of internal wars, “often fought
with more cruelty than international conflicts” (Protocol II). This second protocol
reiterates the changes made in Protocol I, expanding further on humane treatment and
prosecutions.

Specifically, Protocol Il more thoroughly describes the treatment of a

civilian population:
Art 13. Protection of the civilian population
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against
the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the
following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object
of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population are prohibited.
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3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.
Article 13 states that civilians have a right to general protection against dangerous
military operations. This is extremely important to the case study of the Great Lakes

crisis, as the civilian refugee population was subject to threats of violence in the form of
recruitment for the armed forces of the Hutu.

These two documents helped form a distinction between the international and
domestic realm and assigned more specific regulations depending on the conflict
(Forsythe: 113). Through protocols such as these, international law becomes more
specific and attempts to help ease the application of law by making it less ambiguous and
more concrete.
In 1993, the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims met and

called upon the Swiss government to bring together an “open-ended intergovernmental
group of experts to study practical means of promoting full respect for and compliance
with that law” (International Humanitarian Law). This study was conducted in 1995 and
aimed to improve the knowledge and implementation of humanitarian law.

As shown,

the Geneva Conventions and therefore the ICRC has gone through several major changes
from its origin to the time right before the Great Lakes crisis. The world has become
increasingly complex, and the international community has shown its efforts in adapting
to those changes through the documents described above.
Through all of the adaptations that the ICRC and the aid community have
undergone, humanitarian principles have been emphasized.

As the grandfather of

humanitarian aid, the ICRC has defined five humanitarian principles by which they
abide: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and
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universality. The Rwandan refugee crisis highlights specifically the principles of
impartiality and neutrality.

For clarification, I will reiterate here my ideas behind these

two principles.
The principle of neutrality allows policies and programs to be formed on the basis
of need, attempting to avoid any discrimination by putting everyone on the same playing
field. This principle, one that has been adopted by several other humanitarian
organizations, reiterates the general principles of non-discrimination.

However, any form

of discrimination includes political and/or group affiliation, former actions that have been
committed that could have contributed to the need of aid, and other factors that should be

considered when providing aid to a group of people, keeping in mind the distinctions
between military personnel and civilians.
The ICRC’s concept of neutrality allows them to be a nonaligned party during a
conflict in order to coordinate with multiple sides. While is does allow the organization
to gain and keep the trust of all parties involved, it also gives rise to the question of
whether or not organizations actually follow these guidelines, especially in conflicts such
as that in Rwanda.

In this study, I will be focusing on these two principles, although I

recognize the importance of the others as well.
These two principles will be foundational in examining the militarization of the
Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. Impartiality and neutrality are principles that intend to
protect and assist civilian victims, and the militarization of refugee camps, I argue, is a
violation of this safe space that is meant to uphold those principles. However, my
research leads me to believe that aid organizations failed to respect these principles
during this crisis. While the complexity of this particular crisis was overwhelming, it is
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my opinion that humanitarian organizations should have been more partial to those who
had not contributed to the genocide, both Hutu and Tutsi, or less neutral about providing
aid to those more likely to abuse it, such as those who wanted to use the camps for
military bases, to the best of their ability. My argument, therefore, is that giving aid to
anyone without discrimination is not impartiality.

Impartiality means distinguishing

between combatants and non-combatants because policy dictates that these populations
should receive different kinds of humanitarian assistance.

For example, non-combatant

civilians fell under the jurisdiction of humanitarian aid organizations.

In the case of the

Great Lakes crisis, there were also combatants that were refugees in Zaire.

However,

their label as refugees did not award them access to aid from these organizations.
Because they were combatants and in fact had committed genocide in Rwanda, they were
the responsibility of the host state, Zaire. Furthermore, aid was being given in a refugee
camp, which by definition is a safe, civilian zone.

I argue that there was a foundational

instability within the aid organizations, a problem that was deeper than merely a
shortcoming of planning and resources.

I will be testing this notion by examining factors

that led to the crisis and their relationship to these principles of impartiality and
neutrality.
As we can see, formal humanitarianism has gone through several changes,
especially since the end of World War II, and the circumstances in which aid is delivered
have changed along with the formal legality. Most importantly, we can see milestone
such as the establishment of formal humanitarianism, changes after World War II, and

more recent reactions to crises such as guerilla war. While the strategies of aid have
become much more advanced and agencies have become more aware of how to
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effectively deal with individual crises, such as more thorough ways to determine the
needs of a population and structured organizations with more funding and resources,

there are also major dilemmas that have emerged out of formal humanitarianism.

Several

authors have theorized why problems have arisen, such as the large number of major
crises, the number of actors involved in humanitarian aid, and the specific principles that

have been questioned.
Now that we’ve seen how formal humanitarian aid was established and some
major changes it has gone through, we can see how and why it operates as it does today.
Obviously the world has gone through major crises, which have molded humanitarian
policies. Specific events such as the Vietnam War showed the aid community that
policies have to become clearer in order to more effectively deal with massive crises.
These events have altered international humanitarian law, like the Protocols of 1977 that

changes the legal status of civilians and soldiers. We’ve also seen the impact that has
been made by this overarching global change, especially in regards to the ICRC, in
defining aid organizations. Part of this formation revolves around those principles
discussed: impartiality and neutrality. Those principles have had a widespread impact on
organizations, who they help and why they help.
We see now that these principles are not out-of-date; on the contrary, they have
been revised to deal with modern issues.

Therefore, we can make the observation that it

is not the principles that are lacking, but the application thereof. Now that we’ve looked
at the underlying principles of humanitarianism, we can look at a specific case in which
these principles were or should have been applied: The Rwandan refugee crisis is one
example of how important humanitarian principles such as impartiality and neutrality can
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be. The duty of humanitarian aid organizations is to ensure that these principles are
respected and enforced throughout humanitarian spaces that they create such as refugee

camps. Outside forces, however, can negate the efforts of aid workers to protect and
assist victims when these principles are not adhered to. In the next chapter, I will show

the events of the crisis itself and already existing factors that aid organizations dealt with.
Then we will look at the factors caused by the aid organizations themselves. By doing
so, I will explore the possible factors that caused the militarization of the Rwandan

refugee camps and the absence of these humanitarian principles.
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Chapter 3: Factors that led to the Great Lakes Refugee Crisis

The Great Lakes refugee crisis occurred in the aftermath of the Rwandan
Genocide in 1994 and ended with the beginning of the First Congo War in late 1996.
During these two years, over 2 million Rwandan refugees fled to neighboring countries,
such as Zaire and Tanzania.

The majority of these refugees were of Hutu ethnicity, the

target of the then-dominating Tutsi in Rwanda.

During this crisis, several of the refugee

camps, particularly in Zaire, were militarized and politicized to launch attacks against the
Tutsi in Rwanda.

This chapter has two main goals: one, to explain some preceding

events and contributing factors to this crisis to get a broader sense of the story in order to
understand the specific factors that I will be analyzing; and two, to pinpoint specific
actions on the part of humanitarian aid organizations that contributed to crisis. These two
sets of factors will provide a basis of the argument that I will make in the next chapter.
To be clear, I describe these sets of data as “factor” to mean that they are circumstances,

facts, or influences that contribute to an outcome, in this case the militarization of the
refugee camps during the Great Lakes crisis.
This chapter is presented mostly in chronological order in order to be clear about
the sequence of events and the time frame that I’ll be looking at. To describe the crisis
itself and extract specific factors, [ll be explaining who was involved in the crisis,
including countries, political parties, and ethnic groups, and the situation inside the
refugee camps and the process by which they become militarized. Then, I will take a
look at four major humanitarian groups who were present during the crisis: the
International Committee for the Red Cross, CARE, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), and
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the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

I will be looking at the programs and

policies that these organizations used during the crisis. It is important to note, however,
that because of the large number of aid organizations that were working during the crisis,
it is often difficult to differentiate between them.

In some instances I was not able to find

primary sources and therefore rely strongly on secondary sources. After looking at a
general picture of the tendencies of these organizations, I'll extract a list of variables,
which will become my second set of factors. At the end of this chapter, we will be able
to more clearly see the outside forces that contributed to the crisis, as well as actions of
humanitarian aid organizations that influenced the situation.
Rwanda is an East African country of 26,338 square miles, surrounded by
Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire).

According to

the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the population of Rwanda as of 2003 was
11,055,976 with a growth rate of 2.818% (CIA World Fact Book). The most important
demographic factor [ll be looking at is the composition of various ethnic groups: Hutu
and Tutsi. The Hutu make up about 84% of the population, while 15% are Tutsi (CIA).
These numbers will come into play later on when we discuss the power struggle between
the two groups and population growth and decline, especially in light of the civil war and
genocide.
We begin with a description of the Great Lakes region, focusing specifically on
the country of Rwanda.

This will include a brief historical overview of the country

before it’s independence in 1962. Jean-Pierre Chrétien, author of The Great Lakes of
Africa: Two Thousand Years of History, writes an extensive history on the entire region.

' See Appendix II for the United Nations map of the Great Lakes region.
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I, however, will begin in the middle of the nineteenth century with the arrival of the

Europeans in the area.

I chose this time period because of the drastic changes the region

experiences with the arrival of foreigners, mainly with the shift in power and authority.
Chrétien dates the Europeans’ arrival at 1860, when several English explorers came to the
region as missionaries or academics (Chrétien: 203-204).
began- Britain and Germany being the main conquistadors.

Thus, an era of conquest
The territory was traded back

and forth between European powers until World War I when Rwanda and Burundi were
given to the Belgians (Chrétien: 260).

The arrival changed several structural factors about the society in the Great Lakes
region, but one that will be most important to my study is the change in Hutu-Tutsi
relations. According to Chrétien, the two groups experienced racial tension before
conquest, but the Belgian regime only heightened the tensions. The Tutsi had the support
of the Belgians, and as such had access to more resources such as schools.

The Belgians

even introduced identity cards in 1933, classifying individuals as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa

(Griinfeld: 29). Eventually the two social classes were separated by a great divide, one
that has become “‘so obsessive to the point of eclipsing every other problem and being
almost the only aspect of this region familiar to the Western media in the late twentieth
century” (Chrétien: 282).

Although the genocide of 1994 was by far the worst massacre between the two
groups in Rwandan history, author Fred Griinfeld tells us that this was not the first. By
1957, the Hutu had grown tired of their subjugated position under the Tutsi elite and
therefore started a violent political combat (Griinfeld: 30). Over the next couple of years,
the Hutu gained more control and staged another wave of violence in 1959.

Although

there is no official data on the number of Tutsi that were killed during these raids, it is
clear that thousands fled the country (Ibid.).
Three years later, on July 1, 1962, Rwanda became an independent country.

Not

surprisingly, the main Hutu party won the elections and Gregoire Kayibanda became the
first president.

As a form of revenge, Kayibanda limited access to education and

employment for Tutsi. This only increased antagonism.

The Tutsi retaliated only once in

1963, and afterwards Kayibanda started a campaign to kill the Tutsi. According to
Griinfeld, there are estimates that 10,000 Tutsi were killed between December 1963 and

January 1964, while others say that up to 20,000 Tutsi were killed and some 300,000
were made refugees (Griinfeld: 31).
In 1973, Habyarimana assumed presidency, and while the violence against the

Tutsi significantly decreased during this time, they were still being discriminated against
(Griinfeld: 31). By the 1980s, there was a second generation of Tutsi refugees in the
neighboring countries to which they had fled in the ‘60s. In 1990s, The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 900,000 Rwandan refugees were living
in the surrounding countries at that time (Griinfeld: 32). Rwandan refugees in Uganda
created the Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF.

On October 1, 1990, the RPF attacked

Rwanda and so began a three-year civil war.
There was a brief ceasefire on October 30 of that same year, but the RPF

regrouped and began attacks again.

Each time the Tutsi launched an attack, it would be

countered by killings by the Rwandan army.
agreement was signed in 1992 (Griinfeld: 34).

After the fourth attempt at a ceasefire, an
Nevertheless, the killings between the two

groups continued: between 1990 and 1993, around 2,000 Tutsi died in ethnically
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motivated violence (Lischer: 74).

Negotiations to end the stalemated civil war took

place, and a peace agreement was again signed in 1993; “despite the presence of a United

Nations peacekeeping contingent (UNAMIR), Hutu hardliners prepared for genocide”
(Lischer: 75).
The genocide of 1994 lasted from April to July, approximately 100 days;
however, experts generally agree that between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi and a small
number of moderate Hutu were killed (Lischer: 75). The genocide came to an end when
the RPF defeated the Rwandan army forces and took control of the capital city of Kigali
on July 4, 1994. While the genocide in and of itself was an extreme tragedy, the
ramifications thereof were equally chaotic. The defeat of the Hutu forces spurred
massive numbers of Hutu refugees to flee to neighboring countries, resulting in what is
now known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis. According to Lischer, “nearly two million
Hutu refugees fled at the instigation of an estimated 20,000 Hutu soldiers and 50,000
militia members, who joined the refugees in exile” (Lischer: 76). The main countries to
which the Hutu fled were Zaire and Tanzania.

Over one million people fled to eastern

Zaire; these massive populations constituted states in exile with high tendencies for
violence (Lischer: 76).
Now that we’ ve painted a clearer picture about the events that preceded the crisis,
as well as more about the setting of the crisis itself, we can look more specifically at
factors within the crisis that led to the militarization of the refugee camps that were set up
in Zaire. This first group of variables will consist of factors that were not actions of the
aid organizations.

I’ve organized these factors into four main groups, although most have

subgroups that will provide further explanation: first, the identity of the refugees,
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specifically militants and war criminals; second, the role of the host country, Zaire; third,
the resources of the militants in the camps, consisting of both aid from other countries
and that which they brought with them from Rwanda; and fourth, the tactics that the
militants used to manipulate incoming aid.
First, it is most important to remember that the refugees in these camps were
Hutu, the group that had unapologetically administered the genocide that led to their need

to evacuate the country when the Tutsi took power.

In fact, the OAU estimated that

“around 10 percent- over 100,000 people- were actually militants and war criminals”
(Lischer: 81). Based on information from the UNHCR, Fiona Terry tells us that the
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the former national army, were in two divisions: one
containing 7,680 men and the other containing 10,240.

Other units were created of an

additional 4,000 men, coming to a grand total of about 22,000 soldiers.

reach 50,000 (Terry: 158-159).
involved in the genocide.

Some estimates

There were not only soldiers and politicians who were

The genocide involved the entire Hutu population; “leaving

few with clean hands minimized the risk of finger pointing and accusations once the
extermination was complete” (Terry: 170). Non-military individuals became involved
out of hatred or fear or for financial gain (Terry: 170).
According to Joel Boutroue, the UNHCR official in charge of the Goma camps,
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these political and military leaders led the majority of the refugees into Zaire; “their
intention was to remain temporarily in Zaire, gather strength, and return to regain power,”
much like the Tutsi had done in Uganda (Boutroue, as quoted by Terry: 180). The
authority structures that had been established in Rwanda carried over to the refugee
population in the camps; this allowed the military leaders to maintain control of the
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fearful population.

According to the World Bank, these ex-FAR leaders also organized

the camps into districts, sub-districts, neighborhoods, and groups of ten houses. This is
just one example of the control they possessed over the refugee population (Lischer: 81).

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the rest of the world saw these
refugees as innocent victims.

Despite the fact that they had engaged in genocide, they

were also victims themselves of previous violence towards their own ethnic group, as
well as of a cholera epidemic that hit the refugee camps.

Terry reports that an estimated

50,000 refugees were killed by this epidemic, between 6 and 10 percent of the total
population (Terry: 171). This factor only increased the amount of global attention that
the refugees received, from the United States and Europe in particular.

Seeing the chaos,

the Western world responded in the most obvious way in their eyes: humanitarian aid.
In a hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee of
Foreign Relations in the U.S. Senate, J. Brian Atwood said, “The United Nations must be
on the front lines in the war against chaos... the desperate people in Goma, make no
mistake about it, are the victims of this chaos... we simply can not let the cancer of chaos
spread” (Atwood).

Thus, these refugees were not only people attempting to escape

revenge or persecution because of their actions, but also Rwandans who were forced to
leave their homes and legitimate refugees.

Therefore, it is important to know that

refugees assumed multiple identities and to observe the events in light of them.
Second, the role of the host country of Zaire was also important.

The proximity

to Rwanda was obviously an important factor, but the involvement of the people and
government of Zaire was also vital to the survival of the ex-FAR and their intentions in
Zaire. The support of Zairian government and connections to outside influences meant

that the ex-FAR had extensive resources at their disposal outside of those provided by the
aid organizations.

Not only did Zaire provide the actual location for the ex-FAR to

reorganize, but it also permitted free movement of the army and government officials and
“ignored international calls for the arrest of war criminals” (Terry: 156). President
Mobutu of Zaire was a close ally of Juvénal Habyarimana, president of Rwanda from
1973 to 1994, and had even sent several hundred troops to Rwanda after the RPF
invasion from Uganda.

Therefore, when the international community urged Mobutu to

take action against the crisis in the refugee camps, he refused. Zairian border officials
made little if any attempt to disarm the refugees as they entered the county, and did
nothing to provide security for the camps or the surrounding area (Lischer: 85). The
weakness and incapability of the failing Zairian government to act only made its ground
more fertile for the ex-FAR’s intentions to militarize the camps.
The arrival of the Hutu refugees also had an effect on Zairian society: this led to
violence against Zairian Tutsi, violence supported by the Zairian government (Lischer:
82). This made it less and less appealing for Zaire to act against the situation in the
camps. This inaction led to the involvement of other international actors, but no one
attempted to demilitarize the refugee camps or secure Zaire’s borders when it was
became clear that Zaire itself had no intention of doing so. It should be noted that the

role of Zaire was noteworthy because, in contrast, the refugee camps in Tanzania did not
create the spread of violence, nor did they become launching sites for nearly as many
cross-border attacks (Lischer: 76).

The third category of factors is resources: both those that were brought to the
camps from Rwanda and those which were given as aid during the crisis by other
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countries.

Overall, the ex-FAR had considerable amounts of resources, both financial

and military. Financial and military resources came to them through private and
government foreign bank accounts, as well as states willing to breach the UN’s arms
embargo.

In addition, the Hutu did not escape from Rwanda empty-handed: Terry gives

an estimation of $60-80 million in local and foreign currency that was taken into Zaire
during the exodus (Terry: 160). Not all of that money went towards the military’s aims,
but the military head in the camps frequently used intimidation and force in order to
coerce their fellow Hutu into supporting their cause. Terry provides a list of several
significant items that were carried across the border: vehicles and machinery worth
millions of dollars and massive quantities of military hardware, including helicopters,
artillery pieces, light weapons, and armored vehicles (Terry: 160-161).

In addition, the Hutu militants had resources delivered to them. Rumor had it that
flights to the Goma airport contained military equipment for the FAR.

Eventually,

inquiries by Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Amnesty International, and the press led
to verification that there were deliveries of AK-47s, mortar shells, and ammunition to
Goma, compliments of the government of the Seychelles (Terry: 161). Invoices found in
the camps indicated that other shipments had been made, some worth more than $1
million.” According to author William Reed, France sent military assistance to the
Rwandan government after the RPF invasion, and supervised an expansion of the
Rwandan army in 1990 and 1994 (Lischer: 87).

France also conducted an aid operation,

Operation Turquoise, which set up a humanitarian zone in the southwest corner of
Rwanda to provide safe haven to the defeated ex-FAR.

Obviously the militants could use

* See Appendix B of Condemned to Repeat? for multiple invoices (Terry: 250-259).

this area as well for organizing and launching attacks, which made Operation Turquoise
controversial, and it also provided a French-protected zone where supplies could be
shipped (Lischer: 88). Humanitarian aid came in all forms to the refugees in the camps,
food and protection being the two main ways.

Lischer provides a more detailed

description of the role of food and protection, which will be discussed momentarily.
Finally, the exploitation of the aid that was given to the refugee was a crucial, if
not the most important factor in how the camps were militarized.

I include this factor in

this category to point out the difference between the actions of the aid organizations and
the innate nature of aid itself. The exploitation of aid is not necessarily always the fault
of the aid agencies, as we will see in the examples below.

It is important to note,

therefore, that those who receive the aid are largely at fault for the exploitation, especially
in situations in which organizations have taken measure to avoid manipulation.

Because

this thesis aims to include both sides of aid manipulation, it is essential to point out the
exploitation that took place that was not the fault of the aid agencies.
International donors spent around $1.4 billion on relief contracts for Goma, Zaire,
just between April and December of 1994. Between July and October of the same year,
the UNHCR

alone spent around $115 million (Lischer: 90).

I'll go into more detail about

the spending of certain aid organizations later, but these two figures alone paint the
picture of how much aid and money was being funneled into these refugee camps.

In

1995, Human Right Watch reported that the “militant elements benefited from the
resources of the international aid effort through direct assistance from aid agencies”
(Lischer: 90). Lischer gives a general list of four main ways that aid can be manipulated
during a crisis: feeding militants, sustaining and protecting militants’ dependents,
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supporting a war economy, and providing legitimacy to combatants.

I will be applying

all four of these ways to the Great Lakes crisis.

First, food is the most basic way to provide aid for a group, no matter what the
crisis is. Typically, militants can hide among refugees and obtain food aid this way.
Obviously the less time they spend trying to find food themselves, the more time and
money they have for other activities.

Here, I would add that medical aid provides the

same amount of relief for the militants.

With food as well as medicine, militants have an

opportunity to monopolize the aid and make a profit. Or, as Lischer suggests, if militants
did not receive aid, they would simply steal it from other refugees (Lischer, 7). With the
Rwandan refugees, the ex-FAR needed the refugees to be as healthy as possible in order
to return to Rwanda and engage in combat.

In refugee camps, aid organizations can

function as the infrastructure that provides food, health care, sanitation, education, and

other services to the state in exile (Lischer: 90).
Second, sustaining and protecting the militants’ dependents can indirectly support
their efforts by providing for their families and supporters. Especially in the camps in
Zaire where the ex-FAR needed the refugee population to remain safe to be available for
the return home, the humanitarian space of a camp provided a haven for soldiers’ wives
and children.

Like with food and medical aid, helping the militants protect and provide

for their families took the burden off their shoulders and allows them to focus on fighting.
Third, aid can unintentionally support the war economy that it is working against.
Militants can manipulate the organizations to finance the conflict itself by actions such as
levying war taxes on a refugee population; therefore a portion of money automatically
goes to the militant leaders. Leaders of the camp often have a hand in aid distribution
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itself in order to have the ability to divert it. In fact, Fiona Terry in her book Condemned
to Repeat? gives an organized chart of how aid can be manipulated in different scenarios.
This shows more clearly how humanitarian aid “contributes to the war economy of
belligerent parties, in both legal and illegal ways” (Terry: 35). She uses the example of
taxation to describe how a normal, legal act could be used to put money in the hands of
the belligerents.”
One tactic that refugee militants use to divert aid is to inflate the population of the
camps.

Armed refugees can prevent aid workers from conducting a census of the

refugees and, therefore, agencies must rely on refugee leaders for population counts.
Lischer points out that Alain Destexhe, secretary general of Doctors Without Borders
(MSF) said, while discussing the Goma camps, that “food represents power, and camp
leaders who control its distribution divert considerable quantities towards war
preparations” (Lischer: 7). For example, the original figure for the Goma camps in Zaire
of 1.2 million was revised, based on aerial surveys taken by the U.S. and French military,
to 740,000 (Terry: 187).

Another tactic that is often used by armed groups is raiding warehouses and
international compounds.

According to Lischer, “thousands, if not millions, of dollars of

relief resources, including vehicles and communication equipment, are stolen every year”
(Lischer: 8). Therefore, the resources that the militants in the refugee camps were getting
from the aid organizations, aid that they were stealing from the organizations, and
resources that they brought to Zaire from Rwanda created a significant stockpile of
equipment, money, and necessities.

3 See Appendix III for table of the contribution of humanitarian aid to the economy of war.
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Finally, providing legitimacy to combatants is not a tangible resource that can be

physically stolen or misrouted, but it does weigh heavily on the scale of what militants
are able to use for their cause. As stated before in identifying who the refugees were, the
story of the Rwandan refugees is one that drew large amounts of attention all over the
world. It is almost necessary that aid organizations oversimplify the story of a crisis in
order to raise money from the West (Lischer: 8). Aid organizations often paint pictures
of needy victims in order to obtain funding, although this is not always the whole truth.
The way in which aid organizations present the victim has a strong hand in shaping
international opinion of the actors in the crisis.
Legitimacy is also granted in another way: the very presence of aid organizations
can be used to bolster a county or group’s political goals. Legitimacy is increased when
aid organizations are “forced to negotiate with unsavory rebel or government groups.
The very act of negotiation solidifies the reputation of such groups as powerful and
legitimate” (Lischer: 9). This also gives them more access to international media.

In the

case of the Rwandan refugees, militants used this legitimacy and attention to bolster
feelings of pity in other countries, thereby increasing their aid supply.
My second set of variables will include aspects of the work of humanitarian
organizations and how these actions contributed to the crisis itself, along side the
aforementioned outside factors. This set of variables aims to answer the question: What
did humanitarian organizations do or not do that created an environment in which aid
could be exploited and camps could be militarized? There are four main factors that I
will be looking at in this set of variables: the number of organizations and non-state
actors that were involved during the crisis; what humanitarian organizations did that
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allowed their aid to be exploited by militants, specifically security within the camps; lack
of extensive knowledge about the people and region, their history, and the conflict itself;
and the lack of accountability within the aid organization to uphold their founding
principles. These four factors were derived mainly from three main authors: Michael
Barnett, Fiona Terry, and Mary Anderson.

All of these authors have written extensively

on international aid organizations, some specifically about the crisis in Rwanda and
Zaire. I will explain the authors themselves and the main works that I will be using, as
well as extract specific aspects of their work and relate that to the case study.
The first author I will be looking at is Michael N. Barnett, the Harold Stassen
Chair of International Relations at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and Professor
of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, as well as a previous worker at the

U.S. Mission to the UN in Rwanda during the Rwandan genocide.

His book The

International Humanitarian Order is a series of essays that discuss an ‘order’ that has
developed since the Cold War. This new order of the last half century is ““a complex of
norms, informal institutions, law, and discourses that legitimate and compel various kinds
of interventions by state and nonstate actors with the explicit goal of preserving and
protecting human life” (Barnett: 1). These essays describe the relationship between the
international order and the United Nations, but also look at the practiced ethics within the
order.
Barnett describes this new order as one that includes a large number of various
types of organizations.

I will be using this specific point that he makes as one of the

factors within this set of variables.

Nongovernmental organizations, such as Doctors

without Borders, the ICRC, CARE International, and Oxfam, are intertwined in this order
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as they aim to reduce suffering among vulnerable and neglected people (Barnett: 1).
These organizations have been around for decades and have therefore assisted in the
making of this order, creating norms among international actors. Other international
organizations help NGOs in their missions; some examples are the United Nations and its
programs, such as the World Food Program, UN peacekeeping, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization.

Along with

these organizations, states have become increasingly important actors on the scene by
providing monetary and military aid to citizens. On the opposite side of the coin, states
can also provide military assistance or legitimacy to belligerents during a conflict. Even
those in the private sphere who are looking to demonstrate some sort of social
responsibility seek to integrate charitable aspects to their businesses (Barnett: 2).
This large number of actors has had a major impact on the world of humanitarian
aid and has caused the order to expand significantly over the last two decades, according
to Barnett. The number of actors inevitably makes the aid process more complicated;
while two heads are better than one, hundreds of opinions cause confusion.
Barnett also argues that the post- Cold War world has created more complex
humanitarian emergencies, mostly due to the shift in the concept of international stability.
During the Cold War, it was widely assumed that stability came through deterrence and
military balance of power, whereas after the Cold War stability was sought after in
international peace and security (Barnett: 8). This helped to create the expansion of the
international humanitarian order and increased the supply of actors in the humanitarian
field. Actors in the international order, those in the ‘international community’, therefore

assumed more responsibilities; ideas such as ‘the responsibility to protect’ and
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conditional state sovereignty began to emerge and the concepts behind international
relations began to change.

This expansion and the confusion it brings is a main

component of the disaster of Rwanda.

So many organizations were involved in the crisis,

which brought about several disagreements, even within organizations such as Doctors

Without Borders, whose French section left while others decided to remain.
Barnett dedicates an entire essay to “the UN Security Council, indifference, and
genocide in Rwanda” (111). Barnett was a political officer at the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations assigned to cover Rwanda, as well as being primarily responsible for the
peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Burundi, and Mozambique.

Therefore, much of the

focus lands on the UN’s reaction to the genocide in Rwanda, what was, and more
importantly what was not done, to avoid the conflict or reduce the suffering. His insight
is extremely helpful in understanding the international community’s reaction to the
genocide, specifically in regards to the concept of intervention and the indifference
shown by the UN during the crisis. The UN, in an attempt to not stir the waters more so
than they were already, stood by and did little. Not because the UN was aiming to do
harm, but because its sheer size did not allow a collective decision on this touchy subject.
Not to mention, the UN did not have the manpower in the form of volunteer soldiers to

send enough security assistance.
Barnett does not write directly about the Great Lakes refugee crisis. His theory
on the international humanitarian order, however, helps to detect the various actors and
factors that could have been involved in the militarization in the refugee camps.

Lischer

lists several aid organizations who were involved in the Great Lakes crisis, namely the
UNHCR, the World Food Programme, the ICRC, and NGOs such as CARE, Doctors
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Without Borders, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, American Refugee
Committee, Caritas, and Médecins du Monde (Lischer: 90). Just this short list provides

an idea of how many agencies were involved and the number of projects that were taking
place simultaneously.

An evaluation was done by the Danish Ministry of foreign affairs,

along with 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD; nine multilateral agencies and
UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGOs.

This report is extensive in its

reports on aid to Rwanda during the crisis. It estimated that at least 200 agencies were
involved in the repose to the Rwandan genocide (Borton:3).
My second source is Fiona Terry, who was the head of the French section of
Médecins sans Frontiéres, or Doctors without Borders, during the Rwandan genocide in
the early 1990s. Her book Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action

attempts to explain why humanitarian action unintentionally prolonging conflicts and
suffering while trying to alleviate them.

The side effects of humanitarian aid often

include negative political consequences and moral ramifications by inevitably aiding one
side over the other or putting lives in danger due to a failed policy.

Although this is not

what my thesis specifically analyzes, it is useful to note that Terry, as an experienced aid
worker, highlights problems within aid appropriation.

In fact, Terry implies that aid

organizations were too impartial during this crisis and therefore had to withdraw from
giving aid entirely.

In contrast, I am stating that aid organizations did not adhere to these

principles as they should have, thereby aiding a side that should have never received aid
from aid agencies in the first place.

I will more thoroughly present this argument in the
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next chapter, where I present specific documents relating to organizations that worked
during this crisis.

Terry uses four relevant cases to examine these negative side effects of
humanitarian aid, including the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire from which MSF
withdrew as a reaction to its aid being used to strengthen those responsible for the

genocide (Terry: 4). Terry states that two questions spurred debates within MSF in the
refugee camps: To what extent was MSF responsible for the manipulation of
humanitarian aid in the camps, and how could they best assume such responsibility
(Terry: 3)? This debate eventually led to the withdrawal of MSF France, along with other
organizations, such as CARE, Save the Children, and Oxfam.

Terry states that MSF

France left the Great Lakes region because they felt a large amount of responsibility, and
they assumed this responsibility by leaving. The militarization of the refugee camps had
caused many to question the concept of aid and is still fresh on the minds of those
involved. Despite the fact that militarization of refugee camps is not a new concept and
has had serious implications for “regional peace and security, refugee protection, and
humanitarian action, the issue has received surprisingly little attention in the international
relations, peacekeeping, or refugee literature, beyond being recognized as one of several
security implications of refugee flows” (Terry: 7). In fact, Terry notes that only two
other works have been published that analyzed why and how refugee camps benefit
belligerent forces by becoming useful assets in guerilla struggles to gain political control
over civilians (Terry: 8).
Overall, Terry’s main argument is that humanitarian sanctuaries, or humanitarian
spaces, provide three main advantages to guerilla factions: First, refugees have protected
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status under international law from which combatants illegally benefit by mixing among
them. Her second and third points have already been discussed previously in this
chapter: refugee camps attract humanitarian assistance that provides guerillas with an
economic resource independent of external patrons and provide mechanisms through
which guerilla movement can control the civilian population and legitimize its leadership

(Terry: 9-10). The dilemma of militarized refugee camps is part of a bigger picture of
“changes in the nature of conflict coincided with the rapid expansion of the international
aid regime” (Terry: 13).
It is important to point out here that Terry challenges Barnett’s opinion that the
post-Cold War environment is more complicated than that of the past; in fact, she says

that it is the international response that has become more complex (Terry: 5). However,
Terry states that the post-Cold War world has been one in which aid has become
integrated into conflict in regions that were previously off limits to international
organizations (Terry: 13). She also challenges the assertion that “aid is becoming a major
factor in the continuation of conflicts” (Terry: 5). It is obvious that it is difficult to

determine the exact effect of aid on any given conflict, but Terry claims that there have
been “few attempts to back up such claims with the assessments of the impact of
humanitarian aid in comparison to that of other political, economic, and military
resources available to belligerents (Terry: 5). Her book therefore goes into great detail
about the effects of aid and circumstances in which aid might prolong conflicts. Her
works helps my thesis incorporate factors that are broader than the actions of the aid
agencies alone.
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Under the broad category of what the aid agencies did to stimulate an
environment of manipulation and militancy, I have chosen a specific aspect from Terry's
writing that I believe to be the most important: protection and safety, both of the refugees
and the aid workers. First, it is important to note that refugee camps are meant to be
“humanitarian spaces”, one that is characterized by its civilian and neutral aspects.

In the

absence of these characteristics, it is much easier for belligerents to use the space for
military purposes.

According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional

Protocols of 1977 discussed in Chapter 2, civilians are entitled to protection under IHL,
as long as they do not take part in hostilities. Furthermore, IHL requires that militants

distinguish themselves from civilians. However, on the part of the humanitarian
organizations and other international actors involved, there was no assurance that

militants would distinguish themselves from civilians, making the refugee camps
particularly complicated environments.
Terry argues that humanitarian organizations cannot be held responsible for the
militarization of the refugee camps because “it was neither their task nor within their
capacity to ensure the civilian character of the camps” (Terry: 17). However, I should
point out here that it is organizations, such as the ICRC, who have the political and legal
backing of the international community and therefore should assume such
responsibilities, especially in dealing with civilians. As Barnett mentioned in his
description of the involvement of the UN, its mandate and will to act was severely
lacking. Particularly in regards to providing security to the camps, there was a lack of
assertion by the UN to adequately supply resources. As we will see in chapter four, the
UNHCR was a prime example of Barnett’s observation of the lack of resources and
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political will. Therefore, it is right to note that humanitarian organizations like MSF and
CARE should not be held directly responsible for the safety of the camps, and their
difficulty to enforce compliance with international law is noted.

However, as Terry

points out, “humanitarian assistance is necessary only once governments or combatants

have been unwilling or unable to shoulder their respective responsibilities” (Terry: 17).
From this I can only derive that at the failure of the UN to provide protection for the
refugee camps, it was the humanitarian organizations that should have assumed
responsibility before becoming voluntarily involved, as they are responsible for not
getting involved in situations that are not protected.
The safety of the aid workers themselves also contributed to the dilemmas.

This

came into play most often when aid workers attempted to distribute aid to the most
vulnerable refugees, often resulting in threats and intimidation. Terry uses the
experiences of relief agency CARE as an example of this tendency.

During its attempt to

control traffic into the camp, several death threats were issued to CARE staff members.

Thirty-five of the Rwandans that were hired by CARE were murdered and replaced by
armed militia members.
(Terry: 176).

CARE eventually announced its withdrawal in October 1994

It goes without saying that the failure of the UN, states, and relief agencies

to provide security to these camps resulted in violence such as this. Security in the camps
could have contributed significantly to the prevention of the militarization, as well as the
general well being of the refugees and aid workers.

Overall, Terry provides a strong

argument that there was a the lack of security within the camps, and her direct account of
the dilemma in the refugee camps in Zaire provides an insider’s point of view on the
potential consequences of humanitarian aid, despite well-intended aid organizations.
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Mary B. Anderson, author of Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace- or War,
also contributed to Jonathan Moore’s book Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in
Humanitarian Intervention with her article “You Save My Life Today, But for What

Tomorrow?”

She takes a broader yet still helpful analysis about the dilemmas that

humanitarian aid organizations face. Anderson suggests that aid agencies have a
tendency to exacerbate conflict, when aid somehow makes a conflict worse or adds

factors that extend the conflict. The main point is that aid providers should always start
from the recognition that “victims” have capacities and that they are already coping with
their own crisis before aid arrives (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 142).

Anderson’s sociological approach to sustainability suggests that when agencies build on
the strengths and abilities of the community in which they are serving, it eliminates the
tendency to create dependency by helping the victims with the immediate threat, as well
as encouraging their own self-sustainability. However, reliance on the locals can become
detrimental, especially in a case like that of the Great Lakes where the local authorities
had goals to misappropriate and abuse aid.
In the case of conflict, however, dependence on the locals is far more complex.

In

these instances, aid organizations must analyze the ways that rebels may misappropriate

aid resources and develop strategies for avoiding these, as well as developing skills for
identifying and supporting local capacities that are genuinely for peace (Anderson, You
Saved My Life Today: 145).

Locally effective strategies have been created to avoid

dilemmas that arise during conflict, regarding, for example, scheduled delivery times and
quantities of supplies and dispersal techniques.

Anderson argues that despite the

presence of war in a region, there are certain systems and structures of daily life that
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continue to connect individuals, and those can be used to the advantage of aid
organizations, such as religion, community roles, and family norms.

Specifically during

times of war, Anderson says that the main question that humanitarian organizations

should ask themselves is, “If humanitarian assistance were channeled to reinforce the

things that connect people rather than divide them, could it not only meet immediate
needs but also help buttress and enlarge the ‘connecting space’ and ‘voice’ for people to
disengage from war” (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 147).
She states in her article that “well-intentioned assistance often has negative
consequences in relation to conflict” (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 141). While
reliance on locals might be an ideal situation, it is the responsibility of the aid
organizations to identify legitimate local capacities. During the crisis is Zaire, “whole
villages arrived together with leadership structures intact so that early decisions about
how to allocate and distribute food seemed easy” (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today:
145). It seems that aid workers automatically assumed that these leaders were reliable
and trustworthy. Therefore, one of the major mishaps within aid agencies was too much
reliance on locals and not enough background checking on their legitimacy.

Anderson

further suggests that aid providers should recognize ways in which belligerent refugees
could misappropriate aid and “develop skills for identifying- and supporting- local
capacities that are, genuinely, for peace” (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 145).
Again, it is important that scholarship such as Anderson’s be looked at because it has
been influential in the development of aid policies and can explain why a reliance on
locals is so strongly encouraged.

Along with a “capacity assessment” to understand the abilities of the local
population, aid providers should also analyze the underlying causes of the crisis itself in
order to be more effective in their aid distribution. Whether this assessment is performed
by using experts in the area or going into the area for further analysis of the situation
before implementing a policy, Anderson suggests that those in charge of organizing aid

programs should be more informed. Knowledgeable planning could have helped buffer
the problems that were experienced in Rwanda, and we can see that aid providers should
“recognize that the needs they address are only manifestations of deeper circumstances
that cause people to be vulnerable” (Anderson, You Saved My Life Today: 142-143).

It

is important that the aid workers be aware of the circumstances that surround the crisis
and recognize the ways in which their actions could worsen these circumstances or
reduce the damage done. Therefore, the second factor that Anderson provides is simple:
knowledge on the part of the aid organizations about the situation they are going into, and
reasonable expectations about how aid can be manipulated, especially within conflict
situations.
All three of these theorists offer a unique perspective on humanitarian aid and the
dilemmas that are faced while attempting to provide assistance. Barnett’s approach gives
a conceptual idea to how and why the international community has developed, giving

background to the factors that have effected events such as the Great Lakes crisis. He
reveals how the amount of humanitarian organizations can be and often is a major
problem. Terry’s first-hand experience speaks more specifically about this crisis and the
consequences of the militarization of the refugee camps. The factor I have drawn from
Anderson is that aid organizations do not provide appropriate security, neither for the

refugees nor the aid workers themselves.

Anderson offers a broad framework on

avoiding dilemmas and what aid agencies can do in order to avoid them. This theory of

‘do no harm’ can be applied to the Great Lakes refugee crisis, most notably in bringing
awareness to the abilities of belligerents to misappropriate aid and recommendations of

how to avoid this misappropriation. She highlights the dependence that aid agencies have
on local populations and how that can at times be detrimental.

She also points out, in a

broader sense, that the lack of base knowledge that organizations have of the crisis itself
it harmful and counterproductive; despite the reoccurrence of the manipulation of aid,
humanitarian organizations do not effectively plan for these hurdles. The research done
by these three authors highlight these indicators that contribute to how the militarization
of these refugee camps came about.
In conclusion, this chapter provides us with two important sets of data: a set of
factors that tells us more about the elements that effected the crisis that the organizations
could not influence- the identity of the refugees, the role of Zaire, the resources of the

militants in the camps, and the tactics used by those militants to manipulate aid- and a set
of factors that tell us more about the direct role of the aid agencies- the number of
organizations working in the aftermath of the genocide, security within the camps, lack of
knowledge about the crisis itself, and the lack of accountability within and among
organizations. These two groups will be combined with the data I report in the next
chapter: the programs and policies of some major aid organizations that motivated their
actions. These three sets of factors, including the background that I gave on the
principles of humanitarian aid in chapter two, provide the backbone for this paper. The

next chapter of this thesis will provide the final piece to the puzzle. Now that we have
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addres sed these factors, we can see more specifically the actions of some aid agencies

and the connections between those factors and the principles of impartiality and

neutrality.
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Chapter 4: Programs, Policies, and Actions of Humanitarian Aid Organizations

Now that we’ ve seen the events that led to the Great Lakes crisis, the actions of
the refugees inside the refugee camps, and some fundamental characteristics of
humanitarian organizations at large that negatively effected the crisis, we will now look
more specifically at a several organizations, namely Doctors Without Borders (MSF),
The World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR).

This chapter’s purpose is two-fold: to provide tangible examples of

the mistakes made by aid organizations during this crisis and to see how these mistakes
relate to the principles of impartiality and neutrality.
I’ve chosen these organizations for several reasons.

First, the French section of

Doctors Without Borders was one of the first organizations to leave the Great Lakes due
to the moral dilemmas it faced regarding aid distribution to those who had committed
genocide. MSF was largely a supplier of the medical aid that went into the Great Lakes
region, and we have discussed how medical aid can be manipulated.

As an offshoot of

the International Committee for the Red Cross, it is interesting to see how MSF reacted to
dilemmas involving these principles, particularly in light of why MSF established the
organizations in the first place, which we will discuss later. Second, the World Food
Programme, as the largest humanitarian agency that deals specifically with hunger issues,
was the main provider of food to the refugee camps.

From there we move on to talk

more generally about the UNHCR.

The UN was particularly important during this crisis,

especially in the matter of security.

The United Nations represents the attitude of the

larger international community and, in my opinion, sheds light on humanitarian

operations as a whole in response to a global opinion.

Collectively, these organizations

paint a clear picture of the actions of the international community as well as specific aid
organizations.
As this chapter is the core analysis of my thesis, it is important to note the
framework and method that I will be using. Each section of this chapter will consist of

four parts: first, I will explain the individual organization, its history, and what it
contributed to the Great Lakes crisis. I will begin each section of this chapter describing
the organization or international body as a whole.

This is to highlight the foundation of

the organization, particularly its principles; this will include mission statements, codes of
conduct, and the like.
Second, I will look directly at the program documents of the organization. These
documents will reflect the actions of the organization and their approach to aid during the
crisis. We will then look more specifically at program policies that are enacted on the
field. I will be using primary sources whenever possible, including program documents
written by organizations during the time of the crisis, as well as financial statements,
mandates, and activity portfolios. These include agenda items and evaluation reports
from the World Food Programme, policy papers and evaluations from the UNHCR,
research papers from MSF, and general information that can be found on all of their
websites.
I would like to point out that the documents from some organizations are closed to
the public; the International Committee for the Red Cross is one example.

During my

research for this project, I ran into some significant hurdles regarding the public access to
other documents.

Although I am not sure about the specific reasons that these documents
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are not available, it only raises my suspicion that these documents reflect work that these
organizations are not proud of. This is the main reason that, although the ICRC was a

major actor in the Great Lakes crisis and instrumental in humanitarian action in general, I
will not be using it in my analysis.

However, that does not change the point from chapter

two that it helped establish these humanitarian principles and has been influential in the
aid community.
Because I will be limited in the resources that I have access to, there are several
secondary sources that I will be relying upon.

Fiona Terry, as the director of the French

section of MSF during the time of the Great Lakes crisis, is a reliable source from which I

will be gathering much of my information.
Third, after I discuss the organization itself, its overall policies, and specific
programs and actions related to the Great Lakes crisis, I will begin drawing connections

between those actions and the factors that were described in chapter 3. We will see if
these factors- the number of organizations and non-state actors that were involved during
the crisis; what humanitarian organizations did that allow their aid to be exploited by
militants, security within the camps; lack of extensive knowledge about the people and
region, their history, and the conflict itself; and the lack of accountability within the aid
organization to uphold their founding principles- correspond with these documents and
actions of the organizations.

As one might expect, some organizations will relate more

strongly to certain factors than others.
Finally, I will establish a connection between the actions of the aid agencies and
the founding principles of impartiality and neutrality, which were discussed in chapter 2.
Texpect to find that when the programs and the actions of the aid agencies were not

58

driven by these principles, they were more likely to create a space in which their aid

could be manipulated, specifically in the aspect of militarization. Therefore, the aim of
this chapter and the thesis as a whole is to establish those connections, especially during
major humanitarian crises such as that in the Great Lakes. This thesis not only highlights
fundamental humanitarian principles, but also addresses their wide-ranging effects on the
actions of aid agencies and how they, through the programs and policies that are
implemented, can strongly affect a crisis negatively or positively. While there has been
extensive writing on this humanitarian crisis in particular as one of the largest in the 20"
century, few scholars relate the dilemmas that aid organizations experienced to their
adherence or non-adherence to these principles. That is the purpose of this project.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The first organization we will look at is the UNHCR, the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees.

This organization was created by the United Nations and

therefore represents a more global approach to crises. It was established in 1950 after the
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end of World War II in order to help refugees displaced by the conflict. Since its birth,
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the organization has been vital in events such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the
decolonization of African countries, and refugee crises in Middle Eastern countries like
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Afghanistan. The UNHCR has expanded at a rapid rate, now with 7,190 staff members
working in 123 countries. As of 2011, its budget is more than $3.23 billion, and it is
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required to deal with 36.4 million people that are of concern to the UNHCR (UNHCR).
Because the UNHCR is such a large global actor, its activities are wide-ranging.
According to its website, they are divided into nine main categories: advocacy,
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assistance, asylum and migration, durable solutions, emergency response, environment,

fund-raising, global needs assessment, and protection. Its work ranges from working
within the structures of a government as a voice for refugees, asylum seekers,
international displaced persons, and stateless individuals to helping those individuals find
homes and jobs after being displaced.

It also maintains an environmentally friendly

conscience when supervising refugee camps and settlements. The UNHCR runs mainly
on direct, voluntary contributions, so fund-raising is vital to the organization, as is its
assessment of the needs of those it aims to help (UNHCR).

The two areas I will be

focusing on are emergency response and protection. These two areas are the focus of this
section, and I will be showing the aspects of security, which I find to be the most

important mistake of the UNHCR during this crisis.
The UNHCR recognizes that sudden emergencies that require immediate response
occur in the world today. Therefore, aid agencies including the UNHCR must be able to
rush aid and experts into the effected areas as soon as possible. Being able to provide aid
immediately to an at-risk population is essential in providing long-term rehabilitation and
protection. According to their website, teams within the UNHCR are specialized to be
ready for deployment at a moment’s notice. It has also organized emergency stockpiles
of food aid in Copenhagen and Dubai, and has standing agreements with logistics and
shipment companies.

The UNHCR is part of a “global network of suppliers, specialist

agencies, and partners” (UNHCR).
The UNHCR’s data tell us that the organization is able to provide aid to an
emergency that effects up to 500,000 people at any given moment, including being able
to mobilize 300 workers within 72 hours. The organization claims that its preparedness
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and capacity are derived from the training of its workers; a Workshop for Emergency
Management is held four times a year to prepare workers for an emergency, including
aspects of operational planning and security (UNHCR).

It is clear from the organization’s

statements that it has taken many steps to ensure its ability to assist refugees in an
emergency situation; what that also tells me is that the organization’s inability to be
successful in certain emergencies, like that of the Great Lakes crisis, is due to something
larger than mere preparation.

Logically, if an organization’s preparation and ability alone

can result in a successful mission, this crisis would have been dealt with in a more
profitable manner.

However, that was not the case, and I hypothesize that it was the

approach to aid that was problematic.
The second aspect that I want to look at is protection, especially since security
was one of the most pertinent issues within the Rwandan refugee camps.

Because

refugees and displaced persons have inevitably lost the protection of their home state,
they are in particularly vulnerable situations. According to the UNHCR, its core mandate
is to protect uprooted or stateless people. The organization does this by “ensur[ing] the
basic human rights of uprooted or stateless people in their countries of asylum or habitual
residence end that refugees will not be returned involuntarily to a country where they
could face persecution” (UNHCR).
These sections of activity are broad descriptions of what the UNHCR does on the
field. Now that we’ ve narrowed their work down to that which is applicable for the Great
Lakes crisis, we can look more specifically at its policies for protection. “Operational
Protection in Camps and Settlements: A Reference Guide of Good Practices in the
Protection of Refugees and Other Persons of Concern” was written by the UNHCR with
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cooperation from the NGO community.

This paper specifically addresses camp security

and the maintenance of the civilian and humanitarian character. According to the
“agenda for protection” that is contained in this paper, “addressing security-related
concerns depends first on the commitment of the country of asylum but may also require
the involvement of the UN Security Council, the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and organization with specific competence in situations of armed conflict,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross” (Operational Protection: 38). In
other words, responsibility first and foremost lies with the host nation (Zaire in this case
study), but it is clear that the host country may not be able or willing to provide said
protection.

In that case, the UNHCR’s

Statute and Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee

Convention provide UNHCR with a mandate to monitor and assist states in their primary
obligation to refugees. The physical safety that is supposed to be ensured to these
refugees also requires that “the living environment of refugees should be peaceful,
humanitarian, and civilian, free of violence and criminal activity, and conductive to the

realization of human dignity” (Operational Protection: 39). This includes organized
armed criminals, errant military and police, non-state armed parties to a conflict, anxious
local populations, and other refugees.

More specifically, it recognizes refugee leaders as

a source of insecurity for camps (Operational Protection: 39).
Despite the fact that the UNHCR clearly recognizes the need for security, as well
as sources of insecurity that might present a challenge to its mandate, it still considers
“empower[ing] refugees and host community leaders to have a role in security” to be a
good practice for security within camps (Operational Protection: 40). While there are
certainly times when the local population can be used to help provide security to the
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camps, to assume that as a “good” overall policy is dangerous.

As with the situation in

the Rwandan refugee camps, refugee leaders used this trust to manipulate the population
as well as the aid they were being given. This paper also tells aid workers to “work with
host governments to provide security personnel” (Operational Protection: 41). Again,
making this a broad statement to provide protection to a refugee camp is risky. In fact, as
we discussed, Zaire was an ally to the militant Hutus in the camps.
Other policy changes are made or reiterated in this UN paper; for example, it says
that camps’ security should be monitored on a regular basis (Operational Protection: 41).
However, if the camps are not secured in the first place, aid workers tend to become
targeted when security is attempted, thus driving aid workers away from the camp itself
out of fear. This was the case in Zaire, and aid workers could therefore not monitor

security on a daily basis, simply because they were not physically present often enough.
Another issue that the UN paper addresses is the maintenance of the civilian and
humanitarian character within refugee camps.

It focuses mainly on the presence of armed

elements, incursions by militias, cross-border raids, and recruitment from the camp
(Operational Protection: 42). The principles of neutrality is reiterated here, when the
paper specifically says that “international refugee law and the protection it confers is
premised on the principles of neutrality and, more specifically, on the peaceful
humanitarian character of asylum” (Operational Protection: 42). As such, all actors have
an obligation to cooperate in ensuring that this character is maintained, even though states
have the primary responsibility.

This includes efforts to curtail the flow of arms into the

camps and identify and separate combatants from bona fide refugees (Operational
Protection: 42). Accordingly, the neutrality of camps should never be taken for granted

and always monitored.

If the actors involved do not ensure this neutrality, it can have

disastrous outcomes, as we have seen in Zaire.
Identifying and separating combatants from the civilian population is one of the

most basic strategies that an aid agency can use to ensure this protection and security. In
fact, this paper gives very specific definitions of combatant, armed civilian, and armed
element. These definitions are very similar to those in the Geneva Conventions that we

discussed in chapter 1. It is obvious that this is not the easiest of tasks, and often there is
resistance to separation, as well as difficulty in labeling an individual in any of these
groups. Nevertheless, it specifically points out that it is the obligation of the UNHCR
and the diplomatic community to overcome this reluctance to ensure safety (Operational
Protection: 44).
The UNHCR gives a “ladder of options for maintaining security in refugee
camps.” These are: first, the soft approach, which includes preventative measure that
support the host state in maintaining security within refugee-populated areas. Second, the
medium approach, which uses international civilian or police monitors to provide
expertise and support, including training, mentoring, and monitoring. The third is the
hard approach, which uses direct force such as peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations
to maintain security. This is typically the last resort and requires UN Security Council
authorization. The Great Lakes crisis went through all of the rungs of this ladder, and we
will now discuss the final operation that was conducted: the United Nations Assistance
Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR).

UNHCR was a particularly interesting case during the Great Lakes crisis. First,
not only was the UNHCR working with all of the organizations, governments, and

64

institutes involved in the crisis, it was responsible for managing the overall activities in
regards to the refugees.

According to the UNHCR Statute,

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of

the General

Assembly,

shall

assume

the

function

of providing

international

protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the
scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of
refugees by assisting governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the
voluntary repatriation of refugees of refugees, or their assimilation within new
international communities (United Nations: 6).
Therefore, the number of organizations that the UNHCR had to work with was
overwhelming.

As mentioned before, all of these organizations, over 250 according to

Terry, were under the oversight of the UNHCR.

It was literally impossible for the

UNHCR to regulate all the activities that were taking place in the affected countries.
Second, the physical security of refugees is an essential part of refugee protection.
Under international law, as well have discussed, the host state is responsible for ensuring
the protection of all persons within its borders (da Costa: 38-39). However, the
UNHCR’s Statute and Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention mandates that the
UNHCR monitor and assist states in this primary obligation of protection (United
Nations, /95/: 31). The UNHCR has a uniquely mandated role in the protection and
security of refugees, and therefore the issue of security, or lack thereof, is particularly
interesting. From the very beginning of the crisis, the UNHCR was presented with a host
of security complications, but “few of them were addressed in the early stages of the
emergency” (Lessons Learned).

It was due to a lack of early consensus that the poor

security in the camps escalated. The UNHCR could not or did not separate the
combatants from the rest of the refugee population, much less disarm these combatants.
The weakness or absence of government law enforcement agents, which are supposed to
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be supported and monitored by the UNHCR, were part of the insufficient preparedness of

the Zairian government as well as the international community (Lessons Learned). As
discussed above, the UNHCR’s policy to rely heavily on the local population for social

structures was also detrimental.
Security in these refugee camps was, in my opinion, one of the UNHCR’s greatest
failures. After all, it is this agency that is the self-proclaimed protector of all refugees.
Especially in a major crisis such as the Great Lakes crisis, security should have been its
number one priority. The lack of security compromises the ability for impartiality and
neutrality to exist by creating an environment in which the application of these principles
is nearly impossible to monitor.

Therefore, UNHCR should have had the experience and

expertise to predict that security would have been one of its biggest issues. Its lack of

clearly defined conditions for involvement from the outset should not have prevented it
from doing one of the most basic activities that its mandate demands. According to the
UNHCR Statute, it has the function of “providing international protection, under the
auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present
Statute” (United Nations: 6). This includes “assisting governments concerned, private
organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees, or their assimilation
within new international communities” (United Nations: 6). Ensuring that the

humanitarian space that is provided is impartial and neutral, for the safety of the refugees,
should have been an immediate response.

Especially in its reliance on the locals for

information and security structures, UNHCR fell short in its obligations to other
organizations and, more importantly, the refugees themselves.
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We can see that the UNHCR had the mandate to provide security for the camps,
and there was a valiant effort made to do so. However, resources were severely lacking,
particularly in respect to the manpower in the form of soldiers or security personnel. The
fact was, the UNHCR needed those soldiers in order to carry out their responsibility of
protection. It is clear that the organization had done preparation measures and some type
of organizational network to enact the mandate, but there was a severe lack of will power
on the part of the states to supply them with the resources to do so. In response to this, a
suggestion might be for the UNHCR to have its own personal set of deployable soldiers
for crises such as this. Giving the UNHCR a mandate and having it depend upon the
actions of states must be unreasonable and frustrating for the UNHCR workers.

If there

is One organization that is in charge of ensuring the international protection of refugees, it
should consistently and reliably have the resources to do so.
Surprisingly, I could discover very little assessments that the UNHCR had done
on the crisis before intervening.

Obviously, the organization has had some experience in

dealing with refugee crises. However, there was little security assessment before hand, as
well as little expertise about the specific refugees that the crisis involved. Especially
given that the country of Rwanda had been in such turmoil since the late 1980s, the area
should have been a hot spot that the UNHCR was monitoring. As stated before, the
refugees that fled to Uganda before the Rwandan civil war in 1990 should have sent up a
This knowledge would
eee

red flag for the international community, especially the UNHCR.

have led it to establish a more effective way of responding to the crisis, which would

ree

have included major security strategies that assured the neutrality of the refugee camps.
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In regards to the security issues that the UNHCR had to deal with during the
Great Lakes crisis, the principles of impartiality and neutrality played a significant role.
Its statute specifically addresses the “non-political character” of the UNHCR, and the
work that it does should reflect those principles.

In not having adequate resources to

implement its responsibilities, it does not ensure the neutral character of the humanitarian
spaces of refugee camps. Because these principles are foundational for the UNCHR, they
should be in the backbone of their planning and implementation.

If it is mandated with

the responsibility to ensure the safety of refugees in neutral, humanitarian spaces, it
should guarantee its resource supply.

Although it is the responsibility of the UNHCR to

ensure the protection of refugees and uphold these principles, it is also important to see
that it is the responsibility of the international community, namely the United Nations, to
provide the UNHCR with the tools to do this task. The entire international community
fell short in this conflict, and as a consequence the UNHCR could not fulfill its duties.

This lack of security affected the entire refugee crisis and the works of other
organizations, as we will see in the following sections.

The World Food Programme

The second organization I chose to analyze was the World Food Programme.

The

World Food Programme (WFP) is part of the United Nations system and therefore
represents a global effort to combat hunger.

It is self-proclaimed as the world’s largest

humanitarian agency fighting hunger worldwide.

WFP was established in 1962, and its
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vision is that “every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for
an active and healthy life” (WFP).

Along with the WFP, there are two sister branches:

the International Fund for Agriculture Development and the Food and Agriculture
Organization.

It works in more than 70 countries and has more than 10,000 employees

(WFP).
WFP’s mission statement tells about its principles and its actions. It claims that
food aid should be oriented towards eradicating hunger and poverty in light of addressing
food security (WFP).

Intervention in a crisis is determined by the level of poverty that a

population experiences: the poorest people are unable to produce enough food or do not
have the resources to otherwise obtain food that they and their households require for

active and healthy lives. In this sense, WFP enacts a principle of universality and, like
MSF, determines aid recipients based on need.

Its aim is to use food aid for social and

humanitarian protection by providing a basic need to those who have experienced an
emergency (WFP).
WFP plays a major role in emergency relief: in its programs, it gives priority to
supporting disaster relief, preparedness and mitigation and post-disaster rehabilitation
activities. In this, it claims that it will “make all necessary efforts to avoid negative
effects on local food production, consumption patterns, and dependency on food aid.” In
this vast aim, it includes both neutrality and impartiality as principles. Because WFP has

a multilateral character, it aims to work everywhere in the developing world, “without
regard to the political orientations of governments, and to provide a neutral conduit for
assistance in situations where many donor countries could not directly provide
assistance.”

Also, as was mentioned above, it concentrates its efforts on the neediest
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people and countries. This level of need is determined by the Committee on Food Aid
Policies and Programmes (CFA); this committee was later replaced by an Executive
Board. The CFA’s decision was to “provide at least 90 percent of WFP’s development
assistance to low-income, food-deficit countries and at least 50 percent of its
developmental assistance to the least developed countries by 1997 (WFP).
From the research that I’ ve done on the work of WFP during the Great Lakes
crisis, the main problem that I see is their lack of knowledge about how its food aid could
be manipulated by these refugees.

Yes, WFP has extensive knowledge about the delivery

of food aid to a crisis, how to assist in agricultural projects that provide communities with
food, analyzing the vulnerability of populations and providing food security, and
evaluating how much food is needed and the nutritional value of the food that is
provided. Resources are largely based on needs, of course, but there are no requirements
beyond biological needs.

Again, the belief that food aid is less likely to be manipulated

probably prevents WFP from seeing the necessity of this type of evaluation.

Its

documents point out that food aid “can make a major contribution to economic
development through the creation of assets and the construction and maintenance of
infrastructure” (Agenda Item 7: 17), but it seemingly fails to see that those contributions
could go to militants or combatants within a needy population.
The document from which I obtained the most information about WFP’s policies
during the time of the Great Lakes crisis was a review of WFP’s policies, objectives, and
strategies, published in May of 1994, just one month after the refugee crisis began. This
document is particularly important because of the time in which the review took place, as

well as what it says about WFP’s perspective about the consequences of food aid. It is
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clear by this document and reviews that the organization focuses heavily on providing
food aid to the most needy and eradicating hunger on a global setting. Interestingly
enough, this document contains a section specifically for refugees and displaced persons
(Agenda Item 7: 14). However, it still does not contain warnings or precautions for the
manipulation of food aid within humanitarian crises involving refugees.

Although I’ve

found no WFP document that records a known manipulation of food aid during the Great
Lakes crisis, secondary sources such as Terry’s account tell us that food was a large asset
to the militants by providing aid for soldiers. This observation is confirmed by the fact
that original population estimates that were provided by militants were significantly
larger than the actual population of the camps, as was previously discussed in chapter
three.
This lack of knowledge about the crisis beforehand emphasizes the need for the
principles of impartiality and neutrality not only to be enforced but strongly emphasized.
I want to highlight here the fact that WFP documents specifically say that “food is less
likely to be diverted than any other form of assistance” (Agenda Item 7: 8). Despite the
fact that this is a relative statement, comparing food aid to other types, it reflects a
mentality that food aid is somehow exempt, at least partially, from misappropriation.
This is a huge point to the topic of this paper, because if an organization does not
recognize the potential for aid to be manipulated, it will not create safeguards that ensure
that the aid is neutral and impartial. Not only is it a gross mistake to make, it is a bold
statement to say that food aid is somehow exempt from manipulation.
situations in which aid is manipulated, to a very high degree.
of life, it might have a higher chance of misappropriation.

Clearly there are

In fact, as a basic necessity

Also, the fact that WFP

7]

documents recognize the fact that food can serve as an economic advancement to

populations might lead one to believe that it also sees that food can serve as an
advancement for militants and combatants. This is clearly not the case; otherwise, the
previous statement would not have been made. Furthermore, had WFP had more
information about these refugees themselves, it would have recognized the increased
potential for any type of aid to be manipulated. Not only did WFP need a more thorough
knowledge of the crisis itself and the possible effects of the aid that it would distribute,
more broadly speaking it needed a recognition of the possibility of food aid manipulation
in general.
Security in the camps was also a major issue for WFP during the crisis. The
increased need to deliver food aid to civilians caught in areas of conflict has brought

about difficulties in establishing equitable food aid distribution systems as well as an
increased dependency on special international arrangements to protect and security the
delivery of humanitarian relief (Agenda Item 7: 10; Executive Board: 6, Lessons
Learned). This same agenda reports that there were sufficient arrangements for an
assured food pipeline to effected areas; however, there is no report that there was an
assured distribution system after the food arrived to the area. Again, this is most likely
because WFP believed at that point that “food is less likely to be diverted than other
forms of assistance” (Agenda Item 7: 8). We know now from Terry’s account in Zaire
that food was explicitly used by the militants in the camp to control the population.
Because of this belief, militants could more easily manipulate the population amount and
needed ration sizes in order to receive more aid. Combatants in the camps could simply
take advantage of this naivety and provide WFP with unreliable information.

72

Unfortunately, my experience in researching aid organizations has taught me that

aid agencies, including WFP, are hesitant to provide information that reveal mistakes
they made on the field, including the lack of precautions before intervening. Therefore,
as stated before, WFP does not provide a document that specifically details how
combatants took advantage of this food aid. I am relying on the policy documents that
are provided for that time period, as well as others’ observances during the situation,
namely the experience of Terry and the research by Lischer. Both of these authors
address the manipulation of food aid, as we discussed in chapter three.

Because of this lack of knowledge and security of the food pipeline, there was
little if any attempt made to create a neutral food aid distribution systems. Of course, as
we discussed earlier in this chapter, it was ultimately the job of the UNHCR to secure the
camps, as well as monitor the actions of other organizations working in the refugee crisis.
Nevertheless, the food pipelines of the WFP should be secured by the WFP.

If these

distribution systems had been monitored down to the last stage, it would have ensured
that the food aid was not being misappropriated.

The fact that the population and ration

sizes were falsely reported by combatants in the camp, discussed in chapter three, only
re-enforced WFP’s inability to enforce neutrality; there was no validation of the
information it was getting and thereby not assurance that these policies were not playing
into the hands of belligerents.
Especially since the WFP deals specifically with food aid, it should be able to
ensure that the food that it provides is not being manipulated to benefit combatants.

In

fact, this Agenda 7 of the policies, objectives, and strategies of WFP also reports that
there was a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1994 by WFP and UNHCR that
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states that WFP had “full responsibility for mobilizing and transporting all basic food for
refugee operations involving more than 5,000 beneficiaries, including repatriation, in

developing countries” (Agenda Item 7: 10). This memorandum gives the responsibility
of the food mobilization and transportation, which includes food pipelines. Because
WFP adheres to these humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, it is its
responsibility to ensure that this mobilization and transportation is done in a neutral and
impartial manner. The WFP did not follow through with this responsibility, and did not
ensure the neutrality and impartiality of the food aid; this was a result, I argue, of the lack

of knowledge that the organization had of the refugees themselves and the ability of the
food aid to be manipulated by the refugees.

Médecins Sans Frontiéres, Doctors Without Borders

Lastly, I will be evaluating Médecins Sans Frontiéres, or Doctors Without

Borders. According to the organization’s website, it was founded in 1971 in France by
doctors and journalists. Since then, it has evolved into a major aid agency that assists
over 60 countries “threatened by violence, neglect, or catastrophe, primarily due to armed
conflict, epidemics, malnutrition, exclusion from health care, or natural disasters.” Since

MSF works mainly as a source of medical attention for individuals effected by these
circumstances, its employees consist of doctors, nurses, logistics experts, administrators,

epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, and mental health professionals who assist
people during crises (Doctors Without Borders).
MSF is particularly interesting because of its connection with the ICRC: the
doctors and journalists who established MSF had previously worked for the ICRC.
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During the Nigerian civil war, the aid workers there experienced a moral dilemma of
sorts. The Nigerian government had established a blockade against the southeastern
region of the country Biafra and civilians in this area were subject to attacks by the
Nigerian government. Because of the ICRC’s understanding of neutrality, it did not
criticize the Nigerian government. The French doctors who were working for the Red
Cross, particularly Bernard Kouchner, heavily criticized the Nigerian government and the
Red Cross itself for their seemingly complicit behavior (Brun: 62). Kouchner resigned
from the ICRC and founded MSF, saying that the Red Cross’s “silence over Biafra made
its workers accomplices in the systematic massacre of a population” (Kouchner, as
quoted by Brun: 62). The debate over neutrality was key in this situation, and its role
was a driving force behind the establishment of MSF.

These doctors who challenged the

work of the Red Cross, along with others who had worked in Pakistan would eventually

establish what is now Doctors Without Borders.

According to author Elliot Leyton, this

organization quickly became the world’s largest private, independent emergency medical
relief organization. It now has six major sections: Holland, France, Belgium,
Switzerland, Spain, and Luxembourg (Leyton: 57) with an annual budget of $250 million
(Doctors Without Borders).

Because of their branching off of the ICRC, MSF has a similar set of principles
but one that would allow it to move beyond the confines of political and religious
boundaries. Its main principles are as follows: medical ethics, impartiality,
independence, and neutrality. It establishes itself as an organization that brings “quality
medical care to people caught in crisis regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation”
(Doctors Without Borders).

It also works completely independently from any political,
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military, or religious agenda.

Not only do they work independently from these

institutions, but they also have a neutral financial source. “Ninety percent of MSF's
overall funding, and 100 percent of MSF-USA's funding, comes from private sources, not

governments (Doctors Without Borders).” Under its neutrality aspect, MSF aims to be
neutral in conflicts, providing care on the basis of need alone (Charter).
MSF uses an independent assessment in order to determine whether or not it will

intervene in a crisis. According to MSF, this assessment is “based solely on people’s
needs, not for political, economic, or religious interests,” and is determined by the
amount of medical care a population does or does not have access to. In a description of
their financial information, MSF’s website describes how programs are chosen and
implemented: Medical humanitarian needs are determined by performing these
assessments on the ground. These assessments include “the condition of the affected
people” as well as their “vulnerability to a crisis.” “Local medical professionals are
important sources of information” that MSF relies upon. Another factor that goes into
the intervention equation is the position of local authorities: “the local authorities’
acceptance of MSF’s action and adequate safety conditions for our volunteers are critical
prerequisites for any intervention” (Doctors Without Borders).
After MSF has decided that it will intervene in a crisis, the project is outlined in
detail before it is launched; these projects are evaluated throughout the operation. During
the project, MSF claims that it directly manages all aspects of the program and does not
delegate management responsibilities to third parties. Every year, MSF implements more
than 4,700 aid assignments (Doctors Without Borders).
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Now we can look at the specific policies that MSF used during the Great Lakes
crisis. MSF has a collection of special reports on major crises around the world.

One

specific special report published in July of 1995 on the deadlock in the refugee crisis

describes MSF’s work in Zaire reports the following:
In the eastern Zairian province Kivu, MSF works in the Rwandan refugee camps in
and around Goma and in the partly Rwandan, partly Burundian refugee camps in
Uvira. In Goma, two MSF sections are presently working with 2,100 national staff

and 25 expatriates. MSF provides aid to an estimated 300,000 refugees in three
field hospitals as well as in many health posts and dispensaries. The MSF activities
also include water and sanitation and mental health care. In Uvira, MSF is
undertaking medical, including 4 hospitals, and water and sanitation programs for
approximately 55,000 refugees (Deadlock in Rwandan Refugee Crisis).
The factor of security in the refugee camps was a major problem for MSF.

MSF

relied heavily on larger organizations like the UNHCR and state actors to provide
security within the camps, and rightly so as that is their mandate, as discussed in the first
section of this chapter. The arrival of the Rwandan refugees into Zaire was undoubtedly
overwhelming; yet at the same time, aid organizations saw some relief in seeing that the

basic authority systems that were established in Rwanda were still in place in the refugee
camps. Aid organizations could seemingly rely on these structures and focus on other
issues. We know now that that was not the case at all, but that was a sense of stability for
aid organizations, including MSF.

These assumptions that the security structures did not

need to be reinforced were detrimental in the long run. Terry makes it clear that attempts
to separate the refugees from combatants after the camps had already been settled could
have been extremely dangerous to the aid workers and the other refugees (Terry: 176).
Therefore, although it was not the direct responsibility of MSF to ensure the security of
the camps, there was also no attempt to separate the refugees upon arrival. Upon the
failure of the UNHCR to provide adequate security, all branches of MSF should have
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followed the policy mentioned above.

MSF itself states that it will not intervene if this

security is not provided.

Because the UNHCR was not ensuring the impartiality and neutrality of the
camps, MSF could not ensure that their work was incorporating these principles either.
Therefore, MSF as an aid agency unto itself should have withdrawn its assistance due to
the lack of security provided.

MSF-France did exactly this; the other MSF branches did

not. When MSF-France realized that these principles were not being adhered to and that
it was assisting belligerents who were militarizing the camps, it withdrew. Based on the
evidence in this study, the other branches should have withdrawn as well. Not only were
the camps themselves insecure and unprotected, the actions of MSF were as well. The
aid provided was not re-enforced to ensure that it was assisting those who were legitimate
refugees and not those who were combatants.

The overall insecurity of the situation only

made the militarization of the camps that much easier for these militants.
The division within MSF itself shows that there was no coordination even within
organizations themselves in regards to security and its provision as a prerequisite for
MSP’s intervention. Terry reports that although the French section decided to withdraw
from the crisis, others remained and the organization split. She points out that had all
sections stayed or left together, it would have “strengthen[ed] the impact of MSF’s stance
and might force governments to respond to questions which they preferred to ignore”
(Terry: 4). Instead, the leaving of MSF-France made waves in the aid community,
among donor governments, and in the press. Likewise, the lack of coordination of aid
organizations as a community during a crisis can lead to similar results from the
international community.
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Most importantly, MSF is a great example of the lack of accountability within the
organizations. As stated before, MSF branches did not reach a consensus regarding their

actions in the Great Lakes crisis. According to Terry, the debate within the organization
came down to two questions: To what extend was MSF responsible for the manipulation
of humanitarian aid in the camps, and how could it best assume such responsibility?
Some argued that the very participation in providing aid implicated the organization; its
very presence in the area and the provision of resources that were lost made it a direct
accomplice in the belligerent actions of the militants in the camps.

Because there was

such a moral dilemma about what was just, the least it could do was not participate in
something that was blatantly unjust. Thus, the only option for these people was to
withdraw completely from the situation (Terry: 3).
Others MSFers argued that the impact of MSF and its medical services was
negligible compared to major organizations that were in charge of, say, food distribution.
Even so, the responsibility to monitor what happened in the camps was with states that
had the capacity to intervene but so far had done nothing. There was no reason for MSF
to feel responsible while others had failed to prevent the militarization. Not to mention,
there were genuine refugees within the camp that needed the help of MSF, and it had an
obligation to stay and help. At the very least, they believed that MSF should stay to
document the negative effects of aid and speak to the international community about such
matters (Terry: 4).

Clearly the two sides never came to an agreement, which highlights the lack of
accountability that organizations can experience among members.

However, the

differences of opinion should not have effected whether the organization as a whole did
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or did not follow its own policy. Especially in light of this study and the principles of

impartiality and neutrality, which are also foundational principles of MSF, these should
have been adhered to by all sections of the organization, and those who left should have
held the others accountable to adhering to these principles. Moreover, as stated before,
the direct intervention policy states that security must be provided.
This concept is largely important for organizations like MSF that have several
branches working in the same crisis. The organization as a whole should abide by the
policies that it has set up and hold other partners, branches, and members accountable to

those policies. In the case of MSF, security was a larger problem because it was not
guaranteed when MSF intervened.

On top of that, MSF branches did not keep one

another accountable for the policy that demanded the security in the first place. As stated
before, when the security was not provided, all branches should have withdrawn, if for no
other reason than it was abiding by its own policy. That policy ultimately ensures that
MSF’s work is impartial and neutral, acknowledging that security is a precursor for
neutral and impartial aid. Both security and accountability have direct links to the
principles of impartiality and neutrality: security ensures a protected environment in
which the actions of aid organizations can be monitored and regulated, thereby
monitoring that the actions are being impartial and neutral; accountability ensures that the
workers themselves are abiding by these principles.

Overall Trends

We can now see specific examples of how organizations and those they attempt to
assist are effected by the principles of impartiality and neutrality. First, the UNHCR
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failed to uphold its responsibility to the refugees and other organizations that depended
on it to provide security. This led to the contamination of this humanitarian space of the
refugee camps and inevitably counteracted any attempt by other aid agencies to be
neutral and impartial. Second, the WFP confronted the Great Lakes crisis with a blind

perspective on the consequences of aid. The lack of knowledge that it had about the
refugees and the way the food aid could be manipulated led to a policy in which there
was no focus on impartiality and neutrality. Third, MSF was completely reliant upon
larger organizations, namely the UNHCR, to provide security; when the UNHCR failed

to do so, MSF subsequently failed to withdraw from the crisis entirely, being divided
over the moral issue of staying or leaving. This compromised MSF’s attempts at
impartiality and neutrality, ones that had already been dismantled by the lack of security.
It is important to my research and to the aid community in general to see these
connections and bring these principles into more focus in policies and programs.
These are just three organizations that were assisting during the crisis; keep in
mind that there were over 250 NGOs present in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.
All three of these organizations are strong, heavily respected organizations that do
admirable work all around the world.

However, during a massive crisis such as the Great

Lakes crisis, it is fundamental that they stick to the guiding principles. These principles
were established at the birth of humanitarianism for good reasons, and they should be

respected and adhered to while making and implementing policies and programs that
directly effect the lives of individuals.

As aid agencies, it is their responsibility that they

have willingly assumed to wisely provide aid to those in need, and this innately includes
adhering to these principles.

8]

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis is ultimately to connect the principles of impartiality

with programs and policies of aid agencies that have negative consequences on the
population they aim to assist by answering the research question, What factors led to the

militarization of the Rwandan refugee camps in Congo from 1994 until 1996, and what
role did impartiality and neutrality play in creating an environment in which these factors
could exist? As we’ve seen, there are several authors who have detected crises in which

aid was manipulated and highlighted the potential destruction that aid can cause.
However, this paper aims to take a step further than that research and show that these
faulty programs and policies that cause aid manipulation were founded in a nonadherence to impartiality and neutrality. I use the Great Lakes refugee crisis in Africa as
acase study for my argument, and within that case study I look first at overall trends of
aid agencies’ actions that cause more harm than good. Then I look specifically at three
organizations that assisted during the Great Lakes crisis: Doctors Without Borders, the
World Food Programme, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I use
these organizations, their overall policies, and specific actions during the refugee crisis to

general, beginning with the establishment of the ICRC and the birth of formal
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humanitarian work. That allows us to more specifically explore the foundation of the

impartiality and neutrality, and therefore highlight their evolution and impact over time.
The timeline that I create shows clearly how these principles have gotten more and more
specific through global experiences and lessons learned. One example of these
experiences is the use of guerilla warfare, especially during wars such as that in Vietnam.
[include a description of guerilla warfare as a bridge to my case study: the Great Lakes
refugee crisis that occurred in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.
Chapter three begins with a description and brief history of the country of

Rwanda, particularly describing the country post-independence and the events leading up
to the genocide and refugee crisis. Then I look at four specific factors that effected the
refugee crisis, those which were outside the control of the aid agencies: the identity of the
refugees, the role of the host country Zaire, the resources that were available in the
camps, and the tactics that militants in the camp used to manipulate the aid that was
provided by aid agencies. Each of these factors is explained to paint a clearer picture of
the crisis and the situation in which the aid agencies were working.
The second half of chapter three is devoted to a general analysis of the actions of
aid organizations, particularly the ones that tend to have a negative impact. I derive these
factors from three main scholars: Michael Barnett, Fiona Terry, and Mary Anderson.

I

give a brief description of the scholars before explaining the factor(s) that each one
contributes to my study. These factors include the amount of aid organizations that assist
in humanitarian crises; the actions of aid organizations, specifically in regards to security;
knowledge of the population in crisis before intervening; and accountability within and
among aid organizations. Each of these factors is explained, and I give specific examples
of the role of each in the Great Lakes crisis.
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Both chapters two and three set the stage for the analysis that I perform in chapter
four. I chose three organizations that I believe reflect the aid community as a whole:

Doctors Without Borders, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.

Each of these organizations represents a different level or

specification among aid agencies and therefore creates a more well-rounded view of what
happened during the crisis from all angles. For each of these organizations, I highlight
the factor that I believe to be the most important: with the UNHCR, it was a matter of
security; with WFP, knowledge of the refugees and aid’s ability to be manipulated in that
situation; with MSF, security and accountability were the main contributing factors.
I would like to reiterate here the difficulty that I encountered while trying to find
the program and policy documents for aid organizations. For example, the records of the
ICRC during this specific crisis are not open to the public. What is most interesting is
that most of these organizations have statements on their website that lead one to believe
that they are open, transparent, and available to the public. However, during this process I
have found quite the opposite to be true. The aid organizations that I’ve looked at were
surprisingly closed off to my wanting specific documents. The ones that seemed to take
inquiries only responded with a general statement about how to navigate the
organizations’ websites. Especially in regards to the Great Lakes crisis, organizations
tended to be uncooperative.
Therefore, for the organizations from which I could obtain information, I chose
the ones that had information available of the agencies about assistance during this crisis.
I describe these programs, and then offer my own analysis on how their relationships
with impartiality and neutrality. What I found was that each of the programs, in its own
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way, reflected the adherence of lack to these principles and that a stronger observance of
the importance of these principles would have been helpful, to say the least. In the case

of the Great Lakes crisis, we have seen that a stronger adherence to these principles could
have provided a greater amount of security to the area, corrected an ignorance about how
food aid can be manipulated, and helped maintain accountability and security within

individual organizations. These connections confirm my belief of the significance of
these principles and the vast impact that they have on aid agencies’ programs and actions.
The lack of adherence can, as this thesis shows, result in poorly formulated programs or
policies that can cause more harm than good (or, at the very least, as much harm as

good).
As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the interpretations of impartiality and
neutrality presented in this thesis are my own. With specific examples from the Great
Lakes crisis, this research promotes and supports those interpretations. The stability of
these principles is evident through the documents that I have presented throughout this
thesis and through the evolution that they have undergone.

Recent documents define

more clearly the obligations of combatants and the international community and the

rights of civilians, refugees, and non-combatants. Therefore, it is clear that the
perceptions of these principles have changed along with global complexities of warfare.
In light of these changes, I interpret these principles to mean that organizations will be
impartial by providing aid to those in need, not discriminating on the basis of race,
religion, gender, ethnicity, or ideology. Organizations will also be neutral by not taking
sides in a conflict or discriminating based on political affiliation. In that, however,
organizations are not to support or give advances to either side of a conflict. Both of

these principles are not meant to allow organizations to be indifferent to human suffering

or war, nor to blindly provide aid for anyone before determining their potential
contribution to suffering or war.

Impartiality in the case of the Great Lakes crisis would

have meant that aid organizations would have distinguished between combatants and
non-combatants.

In this way, organizations could have ensured that they would be giving

aid to those truly in need that would not have used it launch attacks on a rival population.
The lack of these principles is evident in organizations’ lack of planning and resources.
The principles that were established at the very beginning of formal
humanitarianism have proven effective and necessary, and the lack of acknowledgement
of their role in aid distribution can be dangerous.

Although there is extensive scholarship

on Rwanda in general, as well as the Great Lakes crisis, there is very little on the

manipulation of aid during this crisis. Moreover, there is no scholarship that I found that
was specifically on the connections between foundational principles and the manipulation
of aid. The original contribution of this thesis is, therefore, the connection between these
two aspects, along with extensive examples.

Specifically, this analysis aims to point out

that a lack of adherence to these basic principles of humanitarianism can lead to gross
mistakes, as I have demonstrated with these three organizations.

I have seen throughout

this research process that there are times when aid agencies strongly adhere to these
principles and in doing so accomplish great goals. However, this paper highlights some
of the circumstances in which organizations have not followed these principles, resulting
in criticism from the international community and, more importantly, the endangerment
of refugees. As was one of my main points in chapter three, the growing amount of aid
organizations makes this topic all the more important.
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In conclusion, this paper has several major goals: To identify the importance of
humanitarian principles that were established with the birth of formal humanitarianism, to
reiterate the scholarship that shows how aid can cause harm as well as good, to use a
modern and significantly large humanitarian crisis as a case study to make the
observations relevant, and to draw connections between these principles and the work of
aid agencies. This work raises to the surface a significant problem in the aid community.
To be clear, I have a large amount of respect for the aid community and its goals to
protect, support, and assist those who are in the most need around the world. I also

recognize the magnitude of the responsibilities that aid agencies possess. Nevertheless, it
is because of their goals and responsibilities that they should ensure that these very basic
and fundamental principals are adhered to. Overall, we can now see that there is a strong
connection between the actions of aid agencies that have negative effects and the
principles of impartiality and neutrality and the necessity to more intentionally integrate
these principles into the actions of humanitarian aid organizations.

Policy Recommendations
Humanitarian aid has continually developed since its origin with the Geneva
Conventions, and the complexity of today’s world is forcing it to continue to change.
Crises like that in the Great Lakes is becoming more and more common, and aid
organizations should be prepared to handle such situations as best as possible. Most
importantly, a higher level of professionalism within the aid community should be

demanded. Aid agencies have a high level of influence in the international community as
a whole, shaping the way crises are dealt with and the laws that dictate the actions of

87

those involved.

As such a significant actor, humanitarian aid institutions should be held

accountable for their actions and the consequences of such. The following are some
recommendations to the three organizations that I analyzed in this thesis.
First, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has an overwhelming
responsibility in most major crises. As stated before, its duty is to oversee all actions
dealing with refugees, which encompasses all actions of other aid agencies. Within that

vast realm, there is the responsibility to ensure the safety of those refugees. This,
obviously, is a difficult task to manage.

We can see now that during the Great Lakes

crisis, safety was a primary issue for the UNCHR, and its inability to provide such
security had disastrous results for the refugees and other aid organizations.
The main problem with security during this crisis was lack of manpower, or
willing countries that could provide security and military personnel. Therefore, the most
important policy recommendation I can make for UNHCR is to have its own security
department. This would require cooperation from the United Nations, and all
participating countries would have to agree on the provision of these personnel. I would
suggest that every participating member of the United Nations be required to provide a
certain number of soldiers to UNHCR.

Ideally, countries could rotate annually in this

provision of soldiers, so no one country would carry the burden for an extended period of
time. The United Nations currently has 192 members (United Nations). If five randomly
chosen countries were to donate soldiers every year, each country would donate soldiers
approximately every 38 years. The number of soldiers, of course, would depend on
current global status. If the world were experiencing no crises, then these soldiers would
not be needed.

However, these soldiers would be on reserve in case another major crisis,
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such as the Great Lakes crisis, occurred. This, of course, would have some stipulations:
countries that were involved in wars of their own could be exempt, for example.
Providing a reserve of soldiers would ensure that the UNHCR had enough security
manpower to carry out its duties.
Second, I criticize the World Food Programme in this research because of its lack
of knowledge about how food aid can be manipulated.
solve than that of UNHCR’s.

This is a much easier problem to

Recognition by the WFP that aid, even food aid, can and

will be manipulated would build a solid foundation for further research on its part about
this issue. Independent research about food aid specifically would tell WFP where its aid
can and has been manipulated in the past and how to avoid it in the future. For instance,
closer examination of food pipelines could lead to adjustments that eliminate
misappropriation of food. It is important that WFP look at its own policies and programs
in light of this new recognition.

Initiative on the part of WFP would help any progress be

specific to its particular programs.

Especially because WFP is a leader in food aid, it is

important that it invests in this area.

Like the UNHCR,

WFP

relies heavily on the United

Nations for support; therefore, it will be up to the international community as a whole to
reinforce this progress.
Lastly, Doctors Without Borders is an interesting case because of its lack of
reliance on the United Nations.

In regards to the Great Lakes crisis, MSF failed to abide

by its own policies that required safety to be ensured before intervention, thereby
compromising its principles. The first step for MSF would be to ensure the adherence
this policy, despite temptation to ignore it. MSF’s policies are, in my opinion, reasonable
and secure, especially the policy to only intervene in a conflict if security is guaranteed
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and it has the support of local authorities. These pre-requisites ensure the safety of the
workers and, to a certain extent, the success of the projects. However, it is obviously an
issue for MSF to, first, adhere by its own policies, and, second, to make a collective

decision. If this were a policy that was instilled in all MSF workers, it would have not

been debated in the first place. Unanimously agreeing upon this policy and how to enact
it is the first step for MSF.

Agreeing upon this issue would solve the second problem that

MSF experienced during the Great Lakes crisis: dependence upon larger organizations to
provide security. Firmly establishing when and under what conditions MSF will

intervene in a crisis would promote better communication with those whom it relies upon,
such as UNHCR.

By setting up a procedure by which MSF can determine the status of

these pre-requisites, the organization can avoid dilemmas and disagreements during the
crisis itself.
For all of these organizations and the aid community at large, this thesis
concludes with a demand for more professionalism in this field. This could start with
more education and training for the aid workers themselves.

In particular, the principles

that were discussed in this thesis, impartiality and neutrality, should be clearly defined in
this training and education. This would eliminate any confusion about the interpretation
of these principles or how to enact them. More broadly speaking, education would
prepare aid workers about the situations where they will be working and the types of
dilemmas they could encounter.

More thorough training can allow workers to be

prepared for complicated situations like that in the Great Lakes.
Obviously further research should be committed to education and training
strategies. However, one suggestion that could both improve education and training and
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provide a higher level of professionalism would be to install a licensure system for aid
worker’.

This could regulate the type of training and education that is taught, as well as

test and standardize the requirements for working in a crisis Situation.

This larger

institutional change would require a significant budget and collaboration in the

international community.

However, I believe this influential branch of the international

community will eventually demand this level of maintenance and structure.

As stated before, the best policy recommendation that can be made is for
organizations to adhere to their own principles. While these foundational principles were
established over 150 years ago, they are still very much applicable during today’s crises,
as we have seen. Ensuring that these principles are followed during all aspects of an

agency’s policies is crucial and can determine the success or failure of such. Taking
every step to assure the adherence to these principles can eliminate several of the major
issues that organizations face during major crises such as that in the Great Lakes region,

and learning from this experience can better prepare aid agencies for crises in the future.
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Summary Table

Actions during the Great Lakes crisis

During refugee-related crisis, the UNHCR is

responsible for overseeing the actions of other

UNHCR

WEP

MSF

Relation to Impartiality and Neutrality

Without security, these principles cannot be
guaranteed. The militarization of the refugee

aid organizations, as well as ensuring the
protection and security of the refugees

camps during the Great Lakes crisis was a result

themselves.

lack of adherence to these principles. If an area
or region involved in a crisis is not secure and
civilians are not protected, this compromises the
neutrality of the aid that is being given and the
impartiality of the way it is being given.
Ensuring the UNHCR’s ability to provide
security during crises would heighten its ability
to guarantee impartiality and neutrality.

In the Great Lakes crisis,

security was the main issue for the UNHCR.
Because of the lack of manpower and
willpower to provide this security, the
UNHCR failed to ensure the safety of the
refugees involved. This essentially had a
ripple effect on the work of other
organizations that relied so heavily on that
security.

of the lack of security, which was a result of a

The World Food Programme is well known as the
major food aid supplier during major crises.
During the Great Lakes crisis, its policy did not
recognize food aid as being able to be
manipulated. This was a crucial mistake for the
organization, as food aid was widely manipulated
during the refugee camps in Zaire. A lack of
recognition of the ability of food aid to be
misappropriated led to the organization’s not
paying attention to food pipelines and how the
food was distributed once it arrived at the camps.

The WFP’s misunderstanding of aid
manipulation has a direct connection to these
fundamental principles. In its belief that food
aid is unlikely to be manipulated, the
organization fails to ensure these principles,
simply because it believes that there is no chance
of the aid not being impartial or neutral. This,
we can see, is a grave mistake. Impartiality and
neutrality are not innate characteristics of any
type of aid and must be monitored and ensured
by the aid agency.

Doctors Without Borders is an independent
organization and not a branch of the United
Nations, unlike the UNHCR and WFP. Because
of this, it has set up pre-requisites for its
involvement in a crisis. These pre-requisites
include security in the area and support from
local government. During the Great Lakes crisis,
the safety of the region (being the responsibility
of UNHCR) did not meet MSF’s standards.

Accountability within MSF was the major issue
during this crisis. These pre-requisites were put
into place in order to ensure MSF’s impartiality
and neutrality. Because MSF failed to follow its
own policies, it also failed to provide impartial
and neutral aid to the refugees. This was
partially due to the lack of security, and MSF
had no way of monitoring who received aid.
Despite its good intentions, MSF could not have
effectively provided aid in a neutral and
impartial way. Had the organization been
accountable within itself, it could have
recognized this risk.

When the organization did intervene, it

encountered several issues in the camps and
disagreements among its members.
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II. United Nations current map of Great Lakes Region. Source: www.un.org
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I. Chart of contribution of humanitarian aid to the economy of war. Source: Fiona
Terry, Condemned to Repeat?
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